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ABSTRACT

SENSORY HISTORY MATTERS FOR VISUAL REPRESENTATION:
IMPLICATIONS FOR AUTISM
David Alexander Kahn
Robert T. Schultz
Geoffrey Karl Aguirre

How does the brain represent the enormous variety of the visual world? An approach to
this question recognizes the types of information that visual representations maintain. The
work in this thesis begins by investigating the neural correlates of perceptual similarity &
distinctiveness, using EEG measurements of the evoked response to faces. In considering
our results, we recognized that the effects being measured shared intrinsic relationships,
both in measurement and in their theoretic basis. Using carry-over fMRI designs, we
explored this relationship, ultimately demonstrating a new perspective on stimulus
relationships based around sensory history that best explains the modulation of brain
responses being measured. The result of this collection of experiments is a unified model
of neural response modulation based around the integration of recent sensory history into
a continually-updated reference; a “drifting-norm.”
With this novel framework for understanding neural dynamics, we tested whether
cognitive theories of autism spectrum disorder (ASD) might have a foundation in altered
neural coding for perceptual information. Our results suggest ASD brain responses
!vi

depend on a more moment-to-moment understanding of the visual world relative to
neurotypical controls. This application both provides an exciting foothold in the brain for
future investigations into the etiology of ASD, and validates the importance of sensory
history as a dimension of visual representation.
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1 Introduction
Somewhere toward the middle of my PhD work, my younger brother Sam and I were
discussing the visual system over the phone. Having studied film as an undergrad, he
brought up a simple example of how the visual system doesn’t work like a camera. He
noted that when one tries to film a sunset with a manual film camera and a fixed aperture,
the recorded scene on film would rapidly fall to black, whereas the human eye would
experience a longer, gradual fade - continuing after the sun had fallen from view. The
reasons for this are many, but the biggest one is that the eye doesn’t maintain a fixed
aperture; it automatically adjusts to changes in light intensity to maintain sensitivity. This
dynamic adjustment contains one implicit decision of the visual system - opting for
sensitivity over an accurate representation of physical reality.
On a breezy day in early February 2012, my close friend Dorota & I visited an
installation by the artist Doug Wheeler entitled SA MI 75 DZ NY 12 at David Zwirner in
New York. The installation is what Wheeler calls an “infinity environment.” It’s difficult
to report exactly how large the environment is - perhaps 50 feet in diameter and circular
in shape. Inside, the floor and ceiling curve to meet the walls in (what one presumes) are
parabolic curves. The paint is consistent & diffusely reflective, and the whole space is lit
from the edges of the vestibule through which one walks to enter. With no edges or
textures, with one’s back to the entrance there is simply nothing for the eye to fixate on
inside. The effect is something akin to being in a fog, but with a greater (yet ambiguous)
sense of depth. There is simply nothing to see.
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…Except that there is. After a few minutes inside the space, Dorota walked over to me &
expressed amazement at how many “floaters” were in her eyes. I too, had never seen so
many of them. The percept is a side effect of anatomy; the vitreous humour of the eye
breaks down over time & the resulting imperfections can cast shadows on the retina.
These shadows are always there. When there’s not much else to see, for instance when
watching the sky on a clear day, it’s hard not to perceive them. But even as I write this
and look around the library where I am siting, I struggle to perceive any. I would suggest
this is another implicit decision of the visual system: when there is plenty to “see”, the
system ignores some things.
These are just two implicit decisions of the visual system. In the process of perception,
countless such trade-offs occur.
Coming back to the camera’s perspective, the history of computer vision (up until last
year) has demonstrated another issue: making sense of image data is really hard. Consider
the hurdles in creating an algorithm to recognize your car or bicycle using a camera. It
must take into account every color spectra the paint could reflect under different
illuminations and every angle of view. Perhaps with enough work, the algorithm one day
seems pretty good… until you park behind a chain link fence. Or (to make the analogy
even more explicit) a smudge gets on the camera lens. From this example we realize that
ignoring some information can facilitate other functions.
These observations are central to theories of perceptual systems that focus on the nature
of neural information (Barlow, 1961; Olshausen & Field, 2004). The crux of many such
!2

theories is that sensory information is processed into neural codes that manage to exploit
features of the information in adaptive ways. The corner of vision science this thesis finds
itself in is focused on these neural codes. What information is stored in them, and what is
the relationship between different types of information? How do we measure these codes
in the brain? And could we possibly link differences in these brain measurements to
changes in behavior, or to psychiatric disorders? The arc of this thesis reframes two types
of information stored in visual neural codes in terms of one unified model. The final
chapter applies this unified perspective to look for neural coding differences in autism
spectrum disorder.
How does one begin to approach the question of information encoded in the brain? One
of the most useful tools is derived from psychology - the concept of a perceptual space or
stimulus space. A perceptual space is a theoretic multidimensional space in which all
manner of stimuli (in our case, visual objects such as faces and cars etc.) can be placed.
The dimensions of this space allow for mapping and measuring - and thus for
understanding the visual relationships between all elements in the space. For simplicity,
we will reduce the size of the space under discussion to just the space of a special class of
objects: faces. A perceptual space for faces would need to be quite highly dimensioned;
though faces are amazingly similar, there is still a wonder of variety between and within
individuals. Consider what would be necessary to represent just my face and the faces of
my two brothers, Winston and Sam. I’m often told we look quite similar; if one assumes
that each brother is equally similar perceptually to each other, the space of our faces
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could be represented as a plane with three points forming an equilateral triangle. Of
course we’re never quite making the same expression; perhaps my smiling face is more
like my younger brother’s smiling face than his frowning face. We will need to add a
dimension to account for this. And of course sometimes we let our beards grow out a bit:
more variation, another dimension. One can see how quickly perceptual spaces can grow!
The useful thing about the perceptual space is that they reduce just as easily - indeed we
started by reducing to just the space of faces, and then just the space of 3 brothers. Most
of the work in this thesis starts with very reduced perceptual spaces - a single vector in
“face-space” between two face identities. Having discussed the perceptual space as a tool,
the appeal of this simplicity should be intuitive to the reader. (It is important to keep in
mind while reading that any understanding we derive here will need to be studied
eventually in respect to how it scales).
What does the perceptual space as a tool offer the researcher? Like any map, at its
simplest, it offers distances. These distances in perceptual space can be thought of as
indexes of perceptual similarity. Psychologists have put these maps and distances to great
use for years. To use them to investigate neural codes however, we also require a
yardstick for the brain - some measure of distance in neural space. A few such yardsticks
exist. The one most heavily exploited in this work is called neural adaptation. Adaptation
is a phenomenon by which the repeated presentation of a stimulus will yield an attenuated
neural response. This has been observed using neuroimaging measures such as functional
magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI, Grill-Spector & Malach, 2001) and single-cell
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recordings (Leopold et al., 2006), among other methods. Work by one of my advisors,
Geoffrey Aguirre, just prior to the initiation of this thesis sought to extend this work
beyond identical repetitions to investigate where and how this neural yardstick was neatly
notched for distance (Aguirre, 2007; Drucker & Aguirre, 2009). The early work (Kahn et
al., 2010) presented in this thesis uses neural adaptation as a yardstick for perceptual
distance within the evoked response to faces measured by electroencephalography
(EEG).
(During the period during which this these was performed, other yardsticks came into
use. One of the most exciting uses distributed patterns of activity in fMRI to index
similarity. By evaluating the correlations between distributed activity evoked by different
stimuli across a region of cortex in fMRI, it is possible to index the similarity between
neural representations. This representational similarity analysis (RSA, Kriegeskorte et al.,
2009) and other types of multi-voxel pattern analysis (MVPA) share a complex
relationship with neural adaptation (Epstein & Morgan, 2012)).
Returning to our perceptual space: distance, some have argued, is not the only tool the
space offers to us. It has been proposed that a perceptual space, such as that of faces,
must have a center - or norm - that might have unique qualities. The idea of a norm-based
code is that coordinates in neural space are referenced to the norm rather than merely to
each other. By way of analogy, one could locate my hometown of Cleveland, OH by the
coordinates 41˚28’56”N 81˚40’11”W. These coordinate place particular emphasis on a
norm - the intersection of the equator and the prime meridian. (A separate method of
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locating Cleveland would be to offer a collection of distances from other cities; 190 miles
from Toronto, 408 miles from New York City, 311 miles from Chicago). Psychological &
psychometric investigations of perceptual norms suggested some special properties likely
exist. One class of such findings is adaptive after-effects (Leopold et al., 2001), in which
exposure to a particular exemplar to one extreme of a norm could bias the norm in the
opposite (“anti”) direction. Others properties were derived from the observation that
norms were used a reference more often than they were referred to other exemplars. A
classic example (Tversky, 1977) is that 99 is judged as more similar to 100 than 100 is to
99. Yet another is the finding that average stimuli are judged as more familiar than
extreme exemplars. For instance, when a collection of extreme exemplars from a simple
cartoon face space is presented repeatedly, a familiarity bias is induced for the norm even
if it was never seen; viewers will judge the norm as more likely seen relative to an
extreme exemplar that was actually presented (Posner & Keele, 1968).
In a perceptual space, the norm might not offer a ready yardstick but rather something
more like a compass. Just prior to and during the early years of this thesis project,
researchers using fMRI sought to find neural evidence of just such a compass. The
hypothesized neural correlate was a reduced level of bulk neural response for a norm
relative to an extreme exemplar. Studies investigating faces (Loffler et al. 2005), face
silhouettes (Davidenko et al., 2011), and abstract shapes (Panis et al., 2010) indexed
these responses. In addition to the possibility of a differential amplitude of neural
response, we hypothesized that norms might induce neural biases, similar to
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psychological biases of similarity. Just as an ellipse is judged as more like a circle than a
circle is like an ellipse, we suspected our neural yardstick might measure differently
when comparing more average stimuli to more extreme ones.
The first chapter of this thesis began to play with these tools - neural adaptation & normbased effects - in a single EEG experiment. Though this experiment, we began to
reconsider some of the seemingly straightforward definitions offered above. What we
discovered was the interactions between effects were hard to disentangle. The following
two chapters continue this reassessment. What coalesces is a new perspective on neural
codes, yardsticks, and visual perception.
The final chapter of this thesis presents recent work applying this new perspective to an
investigation of the neural etiology of autism spectrum disorder (ASD). ASD is a
heterogeneous group of developmental disorders clinical defined by social
communication deficits and a tendency toward restricted interests and repetitive
behaviors (DSM-V - APA, 2013).
One of the oft-cited characteristics of ASD is an acute processing of detail in everyday
experience. Theoretical approaches of ASD have sought to explain this tendency from a
neurocognitive standpoint. One the most enduring theories is the weak central coherence
account (Frith, 1989; Happé & Frith, 2006), which highlighted a difficulty to extract
global meaning from features in ASD, likely driven by a bias for local-level information.
Parallels are often drawn between weak central coherence and the stereotyped ASD
cognitive style of “missing the forest for the trees.” Related theories highlighted other
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imbalances: the “enhanced discrimination and reduced generalization” hypothesis
(Plaisted, 2001) focused on a differential manifestation of perceptual ability, as did the
“enhanced perceptual functioning” account (Mottron et al. 2006), which echoed the
local-bias noted by weak central coherence. (I should note these theories form only one
corner of the literature on altered cognitive functioning in ASD. A separate wing focuses
on social-first theories of the disorder (e.g. Chevallier et al. 2012)).
A collection of findings have lent support to these theories: the demonstration of
enhanced perceptual discrimination (Plaisted et al. 1998; O’Riordan & Plaisted, 2001), a
reduced ability to generalize prototypes (Klinger & Dawson, 2001), and alterations in the
face adaptive after-effects described earlier (Pellicano et al., 2007).
Early in this introduction, the point was raised that one of the trade-offs of sensory
systems is the implicit choice to ignore certain information when there is already
“enough.” From just the briefest description of these theories of ASD, it does not seem a
stretch to speculate that just such a sensory trade-off (for example, implicitly deciding
when to “ignore”) is differently balanced in ASD. This places the locus of dysfunction in
ASD within the perceptual system, and likely within the nature of the neural codes.
The idea of altered neural coding driving the autistic phenotype has been proposed
before. Two neural network theories of ASD were influential in the development of the
final project in this thesis. McClelland (2000) summarizes a framework for cognitive
development in which neural networks optimize neural codes dynamically. Within this
framework, the central trade-off struck by these codes is between preserving generality
!8

(overlap or sharing between codes) or emphasizing the conjunction of features. In
McClelland’s example, the former would encode the visual qualities of ‘red’ and ‘square’
separately (and allow thus allow ‘red’ to be used for a fire hydrant as well) while the
latter would encode ‘red square’ in conjunction. This latter style was dubbed
“hyperspecificity” - an increasingly conjunctive, less broadly connected code for all
visual information - and proposed as a neural scheme to explain ASD. A related theory
was that of Gustafsson (1997) who proposed that cortical feature maps (the neural Legos
that assemble perceptual spaces) could be “inadequate” in ASD. He proposed that
columns (the building blocks of feature maps) might be more narrowly tuned for their
preferred stimulus features, and perhaps that the map itself could be more fragmented
(using many columns in place of one broader one).
When developing this final proposal for this thesis, these proposals seemed to raise a
single question: if neural codes are altered in autism, shouldn’t we be able to measure
those differences with our neural yardstick of adaptation? This was exactly the route we
took when designing an investigation of neural codes and autism. However, as the
following three chapters unfold, it will become clear that our understanding of our neural
yardstick & compass shifted and merged. The new tool we end up with is both more
complex and simpler, and proves useful for indexing perceptual differences in autism.
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2 Temporally Distinct Neural Coding of Perceptual Similarity and
Prototype Bias
2.1 Abstract
Psychological models suggest that perceptual similarity can be divided into geometric
effects, such as metric distance in stimulus space, and non-geometric effects, such as
stimulus-specific biases. We investigated the neural and temporal separability of these
effects in a carry-over, event-related potential (ERP) study of facial similarity. By testing
this dual effects model against a temporal framework of visual evoked components, we
demonstrate that the behavioral distinction between geometric and non-geometric
similarity effects is consistent with dissociable neural responses across the time course of
face perception. We find an ERP component between the “face-selective” N170 and
N250 responses (the “P200”) that is modulated by transitions of face appearance,
consistent with neural adaptation to the geometric similarity of face transitions. In
contrast, the N170 and N250 reflect non-geometric stimulus bias, with different degrees
of neural adaptation dependent upon the direction of transition within the stimulus space.
These results suggest that the neural coding of perceptual similarity, in terms of both
geometric and non-geometric representation, occurs rapidly and from relatively early in
the perceptual processing stream.
2.2 Introduction
From searching for one’s car in a parking lot to finding a friend in a crowd, we are
confronted daily with varying exemplars from a given visual category. How does the
!10

visual system represent this variety? Several perceptual models are built around the
notion of a “stimulus space,” a representation of comparative similarity based on
observers’ judgments or their classification of stimuli into groups. Within-class stimulus
variation may be mapped along the dimensions of this space. Rectangles, for instance,
can be described in terms of aspect ratio and area, and color defined by variation in hue,
saturation, and brightness.
A number of psychological models have related stimulus spaces to behavioral measures
of perceptual similarity. So-called “geometric” models postulate a direct correspondence
between the two, defining similarity in terms of the metric distance between two stimuli
within a representational space (Shepard, 1964; Torgerson, 1965). While such geometric
models are successful in explaining a wide range of behavior, certain perceptual
properties of similarity violate these models (Holman, 1979; Krumhansel, 1978; Tversky,
1977). Notable is the violation of symmetry: while the ordering of a pair of stimuli should
not alter their perceptual similarity in geometric models, this violation is frequently seen
in practice. A classic perceptual example is that an ellipse is judged to be more similar to
a circle than a circle is to an ellipse (Tversky, 1977). Often, such asymmetries suggest the
existence of representational “prototypes” which can be interpreted as stimulus-specific
biases producing non-geometric distortions of otherwise geometric similarity spaces.
Prototypes may be the result of long-standing perceptual experience or the local effect of
context induced by stimulus frequency (Polk, Behensky, Gonzalez, & Smith, 2002).
Current models of similarity account for perceptual asymmetries through the inclusion of
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both geometric and non-geometric properties. The “additive similarity and bias” model of
perceptual proximity (Holman, 1979; Nosofsky, 1991), for example, incorporates both
geometric and non-geometric effects by defining the perceptual “proximity” of two
stimuli as the sum of metric stimulus distance and stimulus bias, a term representing the
stimulus-specific effects behind such asymmetries.
Supporting this distinction, studies of the neural representation of stimulus similarity
have identified both geometric and non-geometric neural codes. A single-unit study of
object perception demonstrated a correspondence between neural responsiveness in
monkey inferotemporal cortex and the geometric organization of an abstract shape space,
as derived from both behavioral and pixel-wise evaluations of similarity (Op de Beeck,
Wagemans, & Vogels, 2001). Analogous geometric effects of similarity have been
demonstrated in regions associated with object perception in humans using functional
magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI; Drucker & Aguirre, 2009). Non-geometric similarity
codes, in contrast, have been proposed to explain differential responsiveness to
“prototypical” faces as compared to “distinctive” faces in fMRI (Loffler, Yourganov,
Wilkinson, & Wilson, 2005).
Yet a great deal about the neural representation of perceptual similarity remains poorly
understood. One major question relates to the dissociation of geometric and nongeometric effects at the neural level. While each of the studies cited above demonstrates
neural correlates of either geometric or non-geometric encoding, no existing study has
examined both types of effects concurrently. A second question is the time course of
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perceptual similarity effects: when in the perceptual processing stream do geometric and
non-geometric coding of stimulus similarity occur? This latter question, extending to the
temporal domain, speaks to the former by providing a non-spatial means of
distinguishing these components of perceptual similarity.
In the present study, we investigated these questions using event-related potentials
(ERPs). We hypothesized that geometric and non-geometric features of similarity would
be evaluated during the time course of visual perception, and focused upon several of the
early perceptual and “face-selective” components of the evoked visual response. In our
analysis we examined four components of the ERP waveform previously associated with
various stages of perceptual and mnemonic processing for faces. These include the P100,
a marker of early visual processing (e.g., Di Russo, Martínez, Sereno, Pitzalis, &
Hillyard, 2001), the N170 (occurring approximately 170 ms after stimulus onset) which is
associated with perceptual encoding of the face (Bentin, Allison, Puce, & Perez, 1996;
Itier & Taylor, 2004; Liu, Higuchi, Marantz, & Kanwisher, 2000; Sams, Hietanen, Hari,
Ilmoniemi, & Lounasmaa, 1997), the P200, the positive component following the N170,
and the N250, thought to reflect consolidation of perceptual representations into memory
(Tanaka, Curran, Porterfield, & Collins, 2006). We used these components as elements of
a temporal framework on which a neural model of geometric and non-geometric
similarity effects could be evaluated.
We examined the sensitivity of this temporal framework to perceptual similarity by
presenting faces varying in identity between two endpoint faces. Sensitivity to perceptual
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similarity was assessed via neural adaptation: a reduction in neural response following
repeated stimulus presentation (Grill-Spector & Malach, 2001; Henson & Rugg, 2003).
Previous work has demonstrated neural adaptation of “face-selective” responses in ERP
(Jacques & Rossion, 2006; Itier & Taylor, 2002; Kovács et al., 2006) and the related
methodology of magnetoencephalography, or MEG (Furl, van Rijsbergen, Treves,
Friston, & Dolan, 2007; Harris & Nakayama, 2007; Harris & Nakayama, 2008).
However, few of these studies have tested for parametric variation of adaptation effects,
and the measurement of geometric and non-geometric similarity effects are often
confounded. For example, while studies of prototype representation may observe
differential response to centrally located stimuli (e.g., Loffler et al., 2005), these effects
may result from the tendency of prototypical stimuli to be more similar to other stimuli
and thus produce neural adaptation.
To disentangle these effects, we used a “carry-over design” (Aguirre, 2007) in which a
continuous stream of stimuli is presented with first-order counterbalancing. The resulting
data permit measurement of the direct effect of each stimulus upon the amplitude of
neural response, as well as the modulatory effect of one stimulus upon the next (e.g.,
neural adaptation). Geometric neural similarity is revealed in this context as a symmetric,
parametric adaptation of ERP response proportional to the change in perceptual
similarity. Non-geometric neural similarity, suggestive of explicit neural representation of
a prototype or central tendency of the stimulus space, was modeled as an asymmetric
modulation of the ERP response dependent upon the direction of stimulus transition.
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2.3 Materials and Methods
2.3.1 Subjects
Six right-handed subjects (3 women, 3 men) between the ages of 22 and 39 (mean age
29.5) with normal or corrected-to-normal vision participated in the study. All subjects
provided informed consent under the guidelines of the Institutional Review Board of the
University of Pennsylvania and the Declaration of Helsinki.
2.3.2 Stimuli
Two neutral faces (subtending 9.4˚ x 10.9˚ of visual angle) adapted from the NimStim
stimulus set (Tottenham et al., 2009), varying in eye and mouth identity, were used to
create a linear morph, yielding five stimuli varying in 25% increments. (Since the actual
images used for experimentation are not publishable, all figures use example morphs
from a different stimulus set.) All faces (Figure 2.1A) were cropped of external facial
features using the same selection boundary shape (ellipse, 3 pixel feathering) and set to
grayscale bitmaps in Adobe® Photoshop®.
The similarity of the resulting face images was analyzed using a biologically motivated,
multi-scale, Gabor-filter model of V1 cortex (Renninger & Malik, 2004). A multidimensional scaling (MDS) analysis of the computational similarity scores revealed that,
as expected, the faces varied along a single dimension and had roughly equal spacing
between the 5 stimuli (spacing between adjacent, nominal 25% morphs: 30%, 24%, 21%,
25%).
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Figure 2.1: Example stimuli and presentation.
Representative example stimuli are presented here as the actual stimuli used were not
approved for publication. (a) The experimental stimuli consisted of five faces morphed in
identity between two endpoint identities (Face A and B) in 25% increments; subjects
were not informed of the stimulus space arrangement. Subjects were instructed to
monitor for the appearance of a target face (far right) whose identity was distinct from the
morph axis. (b) Stimulus presentation. Stimuli were presented for 1000 ms with an ISI of
200, 300 or 400 ms, counterbalanced across trials using a type 1, index 1 sequence
(Aguirre, 2007) with 18 elements.

2.3.3 Behavioral Assessment of Stimulus Similarity
A behavioral, reaction time study was used to confirm the monotonic ordering of the
perceptual similarity of the stimuli along the face morph continuum. All subjects (N = 6)
from the ERP study participated in the behavioral study several days following ERP data
collection.
The 5 faces from the morph continuum were used as stimuli and presented side-by-side
on a computer screen using the PsychToolbox (Brainard, 1997; Pelli, 1997) for MATLAB
(Mathworks, Andover, MA). Subjects were instructed to respond with a button press to
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indicate if the pair of faces were the same or different (buttons indicating same or
different were randomized to right or left across subjects). Each trial consisted of a sideby-side face presentation lasting until the subjects responded with a button press,
followed by a 250 ms inter-trial interval. Runs consisted of 640 trials, with breaks
occurring every 40 trials. “Same” trials, in which the face identity was the same,
occurred with equal frequency as “different” trials. Within the “different” trials, the
metric distances (∆25, ∆50, ∆75, ∆100) along the morph continuum occurred with equal
frequency.
For each different face pair for each subject, the inverse of the median of correct reaction
times was found and entered into a distance matrix for multi-dimensional scaling (MDS)
analysis (Kruskal & Wish, 1978). MDS analysis for each subject was performed for each
subject using the MATLAB cmdscale() function. Coordinates were centered about the
50% face for each subject, and then averaged across subject to yield estimates of stimulus
placement. The first dimension of the MDS estimate was retained.
2.3.4 ERP Stimulus Presentation
Each run consisted of 648 trials; each subject underwent 3 consecutive runs for a total of
1944 stimulus presentations. Each trial consisted of a stimulus presentation for 1000 ms,
followed by an ISI of 200, 300, or 400 ms (counterbalanced across trials). Stimulus order
was determined by a first-order, counter-balanced, n=18, type 1, index 1 sequence
(Aguirre, 2007). An 18-element sequence was required to counterbalance the 6 stimuli (5
morphs and 1 target) crossed with the three durations of ISI that could follow each
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stimulus. During the ISI a central white fixation cross was presented on the same mean
gray background surrounding the stimuli. Subjects were instructed to respond with a
button press to the occurrence of a target face from outside the morph continuum (Figure
2.1A, far right). Subjects were trained on a simplified version of the task immediately
prior to the experiment to ensure accurate identification of the target face. Target trials
and trials immediately following target presentations were excluded from the main
analyses.
Stimuli were presented using EPrime 2 (Psychology Software Tools, Inc.) on a Dell 24
inch LCD display situated 100 cm from the subject at eye level. Task responses were also
collected through EPrime 2. To obtain “sensors of interest” for experimental analysis,
after the main experiment subjects completed a short “localizer” experiment with faces,
houses, and everyday objects (100 exemplars each), randomly interleaved. Stimuli in the
localizer were presented on a white background with a black fixation cross (9.2° x 7.7°
visual angle) for 300 ms (ITI jittered between 900 and 1100 ms); subjects were instructed
to passively view the stimuli.
2.3.5 ERP Data Collection
Data collection was performed on a BioSemi ActiveTwo system (http://
www.biosemi.com/products.htm) with 128 active electrodes with sintered Ag-AgCl tips
in fitted headcaps. Evoked brain potentials were digitized continuously at a sampling rate
of 512 Hz with default low-pass filtering at 1/5 of the sampling rate (http://
www.biosemi.com/faq/adjust_samplerate.htm). Two additional electrodes with a 4mm
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sintered Ag-AgCl pallet were also placed bilaterally on the mastoids as references for
data import (http://www.biosemi.com/faq/cms&drl.htm). Electrical offsets were verified
to be between -20 and 20 µV for every channel prior to data collection.

A

B

Target vs. Non-Target (N=6)
6

µV

P100
“P200”

Non-Target
Target

4

2

0

N170
100 ms

−2

N250

Figure 2.2: ERP sensor of interest (SOI) selection and component definition.
(a) Twenty-one face-selective (black dots) SOIs were selected across subjects using an
independent localizer task (Face > House). (b) Component identification. Grand-average
waveforms (N = 6) comparing the response to trials in which the target face was
presented and all non-target trials. The P100 and N170 are the first positive and negative
deflection, respectively. The N250 is functionally defined as having a greater negative
deflection for target recognition (Tanaka et al., 2006).

2.3.6 ERP Pre-Processing and Analysis
Data were processed offline using the EEGLAB toolbox (Delorme & Makeig, 2004) for
MATLAB. Sensors were selected for analysis using a “sensor of interest” (SOI) approach
(Liu, Harris, & Kanwisher, 2002), via a point-to-point t-test comparing face and house
conditions in the “localizer” scan. Significant channels for each subject were identified
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within the N170 and N250 latency ranges, and group channels (Figure 2.2A) used for
subsequent analysis were selected if they were identified as significant in a majority of
subjects (4 out of 6). Group average waveforms across all non-target trials for each sensor
can be found in Supplementary Figure 1.
All data for each subject were saved from BioSemi ActiView and imported by run
directly into EEGLAB. Mastoid channels were indicated as references to EEGLAB upon
import and excluded; data were re-referenced immediately to the average signal of all
128 cranial channels. Data were epoched to a time window of 700 ms (100 ms prestimulus onset and 600 ms post) and baseline corrected (100 ms pre-stimulus onset).
Trials containing artifacts (e.g., eye blinks) were identified and removed automatically
using a ±100 µV threshold (average rejection rate across subjects for trials used in the
main analysis was 16.7%, with a range of 5.3% - 38.8%).
ERP components of interest were identified for each subject individually using data
averaged over all non-target conditions across the “sensors of interest” defined at the
group level (Figure 2.2B). The previously-described P100 and N170 were defined on the
basis of latency and direction of deflection, while the N250 was defined by the
comparison of target and non-target faces (Tanaka et al., 2006). Inspection of our results
also revealed a meaningful deflection between the N170 and N250, here called the P200.
For each subject’s grand average waveform, the time points of the local minima (for
N170 and N250) and local maxima (for P100 and P200) were identified within search
windows (P100: 125-175 ms; N170: 175-225 ms; P200: 225-275 ms; N250: 300-350 ms)
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and used as centers of the respective components for that subject. For each subject, the
value of each component for each trial in each condition was then determined as a sum of
the seven data points surrounding and including the subject’s component center
(approximating a 13.6 msec integral about the component center).
This area measure was computed for each trial, rather than across the trial-averaged data,
to facilitate modeling of the data using a general linear model (GLM). Though commonly
employed in fMRI analysis, GLM is rarely applied to ERPs. However, the GLM
approach is methodologically superior for studies of similarity space, as it provides
unbiased parameter estimates of both the “direct effect” (Aguirre, 2007) of morph
identity, and of carry-over effects associated with similarity to the preceding face. If
direct effects alone had been measured, the amplitude for (e.g.) the extreme Face A would
be influenced by the tendency of that extreme Face A to be preceded by dissimilar faces,
and thus be subject to less adaptation. Simultaneous estimation of the direct and carryover effects in the context of a counterbalanced stimulus order allows the estimates to be
efficient and unbiased. Similarly, as each condition in the non-geometric bias model
represented a different subset of face identities, the simultaneous modeling of this effect
and the direct effects ensures unbiased estimation of each.
For each subject, the data for each component (P100, N170, P200, N250) were entered
into a general linear model composed of 11 covariates. Five covariates coded for the
particular morph identity (Figure 2.1A) presented on any one trial: the “direct effect” of a
given morph identity upon the amplitude of an ERP component. The remaining
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covariates modeled carry-over effects, or the effect of the status of the prior trial upon
response amplitude for a given trial. Five of these covariates modeled the different sizes
of change in stimulus identity between one trial and the next (∆0%, ∆25%, ∆50%, ∆75%,
∆100%; Figure 2.4A); each covariate modeled those trials which had the given amount of
identity change. A final covariate modeled asymmetric bias, and was set to have a
positive value for trials in which the preceding trial was at the extreme of the morph
continuum (0% or 100%) and the current trial at the center (50%), and a negative value
for transitions in the other direction (from 50% to 0% or 100%). Trials in which the target
face was presented, and the trials that followed target face presentations, were excluded.
The estimates obtained from this first-order analysis were then collected across subjects
into a second-order, random effects ANOVA analysis to test hypotheses of interest.
2.4 Results
In this experiment, we explored the time course of perceptual similarity by recording
ERPs during face perception. Given that behavioral judgment of similarity has been
hypothesized to consist of geometric effects of stimulus similarity and non-geometric
effects of stimulus-specific bias, we tested if graded neural adaptation in the ERP data
was consistent with this dual-effects model.
2.4.1 Behavioral Measure of Perceptual Similarity
To confirm that the stimuli were linearly ordered in perceived similarity, we collected a
behavioral measure of similarity in all subjects. All subjects participated in a paireddiscrimination task using the face stimuli. Accuracy across subjects was sufficient (mean
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d’ 2.15) to allow an analysis of reaction time effects. An MDS analysis was conducted for
each subject on the average reciprocal reaction time for each face pairing, and then
averaged across subjects. Figure 2.3 presents the position of the five faces on the first
MDS dimension, which accounts for 55% of the variance. As can be seen, the first
dimension contained a monotonic ordering of the stimuli, with somewhat greater spacing
of the faces away from the 50% morph. There was substantial agreement across subjects
on the perceptual similarity of the stimuli as demonstrated by the small across-subject
error bars. This ordering of the stimuli confirms that, as expected from the stimulus
design, subjects perceived a monotonic perceptual change in identity across the face
morph continuum.

Dimension 1

0

25

50

75

100 % Face B

±SEM
-0.8

-0.6 -0.4 -0.2
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
Position in MDS space (arbitrary units)

0.8

Figure 2.3: Behavioral results.
Inverse reaction times from a paired discrimination task from each of six subjects were
entered into a multi-dimensional scaling analysis, with the resulting coordinates centered
about the 50% face. The first dimension of the resulting model is displayed, which orders
the faces monotonically along the morph continuum. This first dimension accounts for
55% of the variance. Error bars indicate plus/minus standard error of the mean across
subjects.
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2.4.2 Geometric Effect of Stimulus Similarity in ERP responses
ERP data were collected while subjects viewed a continuous stream of stimuli from the
face continuum, presented in a counter-balanced order. ERP responses were assessed in
relation to the identity of the face being presented, as well as the relationship of the
current stimulus to the prior stimulus.
We first tested for a geometric effect of stimulus similarity based on the absolute metric
distance from the preceding stimulus to the current stimulus along the face identity
continuum. Data from each trial were binned depending on the morph distance between
the face shown and the previous image, resulting in five similarity distances (∆0, ∆25,
∆50, ∆75, ∆100). Thus, a distance of ∆0 would be a repetition of the identical stimulus,
whereas ∆100 represented a stimulus at one extreme of the morph continuum following
the face at the opposite extreme (Figure 2.4A).
Because of the monotonic ordering of the perceptual similarity space used here we would
predict that the representation of metric stimulus similarity should change monotonically
as a function of perceptual distance. In particular, given previous findings of neural
adaptation in MEG (Furl et al., 2007; Harris & Nakayama, 2007; Harris & Nakayama,
2008) and ERP (Itier & Taylor, 2002; Jacques & Rossion, 2006; Kovács et al., 2006), we
would predict greatest attenuation for ∆0, the identical repetition condition, with
decreasing adaptation for increasing perceptual distances between stimuli.
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Figure 2.4: Geometric effect of
similarity
(a) Trials were grouped based upon
the metric distance of the preceding
stimulus to the current stimulus
along the morphed face continuum.
Trials in which the target face was
the current or preceding stimulus
were excluded from analysis. (b)
Grand-average waveforms (across
all significant sensors; Figure 2.2)
comparing each distance transition
condition. A significant interaction
of component and distance
condition was observed, and within
the P200 component there was a
significant effect of distance
(asterisk). Y-axis is aligned to
stimulus onset. (c) Group average
beta-values from the P200 for the
five covariates modeling each
distance condition in the general
linear model. A significant effect of
distance was observed, with a
significant linear contrast. Error bars
correspond to the between-subject
SEM.

Grand average waveforms across all significant ERP channels (Figure 2.2) for each
perceptual distance condition are displayed in Figure 2.4B. While the early perceptual
P100 and N170 components showed no discernible effect of stimulus similarity, a graded
adaptation effect is clearly visible between the N170 and N250 components. The most
positive deflection for this component occurs in the ∆0 condition, with decreasing
amplitudes for greater perceptual distances. Modulation of the P200 component,
therefore, appears to index the earliest stage of processing associated with computations
of metric stimulus similarity. Caution is required in interpreting these average plots,
however. As discussed previously, apparent graded responses in the waveforms could
result not from an adaptation effect, but instead from the unbalanced representation of
particular face identities in a given dissimilarity pair (see Supplementary Table 1).
To test this finding in an unbiased manner, beta values from the general linear model
were obtained for each subject and component, representing the weight on covariates
modeling each absolute distance condition. These measures are independent of any
“direct-effect” of stimulus identity (e.g., a hypothetically larger response to the extreme
Face A or Face B). A repeated-measures ANOVA with component (P100, N170, P200,
N250), and perceptual distance (∆0, ∆25, ∆50, ∆75, ∆100) as factors showed a significant
interaction between component and distance [F(12, 60) = 5.05, p = 0.00001], confirming
that the effect of stimulus similarity is not seen for all components. Follow-up one-way
repeated-measures ANOVAs for each component found a significant main effect of
distance for the P200 [F(4, 20) = 6.01, p = 0.002] (Figure 2.4C), but no other components
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(all F tests < 2.8, ps > 0.05). The adaptation effect at the P200 was well-modeled by a
linear contrast [F(1, 5) = 12.9, p = 0.016]. While a similar ordering of the adapted
response is visible in the grand average waveform at the later N250 (Figure 2.4B), this
effect was not significant (F(4, 20) = 3.38, p = 0.125).
Therefore, these data suggest that neural sensitivity to perceptual similarity begins within
the first 400 ms of perceptual processing after stimulus onset. While the early perceptual
P100 and N170 components do not show an effect of stimulus similarity, graded neural
adaptation related to symmetric perceptual distance can be seen at the stage of processing
following the N170, the P200 response. Along with its temporal position between the
N170 and N250, this finding could be interpreted as placing the P200 at an intermediate
cognitive stage between perceptual and mnemonic encoding.
2.4.3 Non-Geometric Effect of Asymmetric Bias in ERP Responses
In addition to the geometric representation of stimulus similarity, we also tested for nongeometric, asymmetric neural representation of the stimulus space. Given behavioral
findings demonstrating a bias for more ‘prototypical’ stimuli (Op de Beeck, Wagemans,
& Vogels, 2003), we hypothesized that the central face in the set, being an average of the
faces at the extremes, would yield a differential effect on neural adaptation depending on
whether it was a prior or current stimulus.
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Figure 2.5: Non-geometric effects of
similarity
(a) Trials were grouped based upon
the direction of transition. “Towards
center” trials were those in which
the 50% face was presented
following a face at either extreme of
the morph continuum. “Towards
extreme” trials had the opposite
transition. (b) Grand-average
waveforms (across all significant
sensors; Figure 2.2) comparing each
condition. A significant interaction
of component and direction
condition was observed, and
significant effects of direction were
observed within the N170 and N250
components (asterisks). Y-axis is
aligned to stimulus onset. (c) Groupaverage beta-values from the N170
and N250 components for the
covariate modeling the bias
condition. Both components had
significant weighting on the bias
covariate, showing greater
adaptation for the “towards center”
transition in line with described
prototype effects. These beta
estimates are corrected for any
“direct” effect of stimulus identity
(i.e., a tendency for a larger
amplitude response to “extreme”
faces).

We compared the response on trials in which the central face is preceded by either of the
two faces on the extreme of the stimulus space to trials in which the extreme faces are
preceded by the central face (Figure 2.5A). Crucially, both of these conditions represent
the same metric distance transition (∆50), but vary in the direction of transition (‘towards
the center’ of the stimulus space, and ‘towards the extremes’). Previous work has
proposed that extreme stimuli preceded by more central or prototypical stimuli are
perceived as more dissimilar than central stimuli preceded by extremes (Tversky, 1977;
Op de Beeck et al., 2003). Therefore, we predicted that neural adaptation would be
sensitive to the direction of stimulus transition, with greater neural adaptation for
transitions towards the center and less adaptation towards the extreme.
A group average of the two bias conditions is plotted in Figure 2.5B. In line with our
predictions, transitions from the center of the stimulus space towards the extremes yield a
greater negative deflection—but only at the N170 and N250 components. In contrast, the
P100 and P200 display equal adaptation for both presentation orders. Again, these
average waveforms confound direct and carry-over effects due to unbalanced
representation of transitions and face identities (see Supplementary Table 2).
To evaluate the statistical significance of this effect, we modeled the stimulus transition
as a covariate in a general linear model analysis. Loading on this covariate indexes the
asymmetric carry-over effect of the transition, independent of other symmetric carry-over
or direct effects. A repeated-measures ANOVA for the single bias covariate with
component (P100, N170, P200, N250) as a factor showed a significant main effect of
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component [F(3,15) = 7.536, p = 0.003]. Follow-up one-sample t-tests across subjects
indicated this asymmetric bias is significant in the N170 [t(5) = 3.36, p = 0.02] and N250
[t(5) = 2.65, p = 0.045] components (Figure 2.5C).
Thus, asymmetric bias effects also occur within the first several hundred milliseconds of
visual processing. Interestingly, in contrast to the N170 and N250 responses, the P200
showed no significant asymmetric bias. This suggests, regardless of how geometric and
non-geometric effects of similarity interact psychologically, the earliest neural stages
associated with these computations are temporally separated. The visible asymmetric bias
at the relatively early N170 response may be indicative that such bias effects need not
rely on higher-level conceptual processing, but may be extracted relatively rapidly and
early in the visual processing stream.
2.4.4 Direct Effects of Stimulus Identity on ERP Responses
Finally, we examined the “direct” effect of stimulus identity upon the ERP response.
Studies of “prototype” responses in fMRI to faces, for example, have reported that there
is a larger amplitude of neural response to distinct, as opposed to typical, stimuli (Loffler
et al., 2005).
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Figure 2.6: Direct effects of
stimulus identity
(a) Trials were grouped based upon
the identity along the morph
continuum shown. (b) Grandaverage waveforms (across all
significant sensors; Figure 2.2)
comparing each identity condition.
A significant main effect of identity
was observed, but no significant
interaction of identity and
component. Y-axis is aligned to
stimulus-onset. (c) Group-average
beta values collapsed across
component are shown. As there was
no significant main effect of
component, or interaction of
component with identity condition,
beta-values were mean-centered
within component for each subject,
averaged across component for each
subject, and then averaged across
subject for display. Error bars
correspond to between-subject SEM
of mean-centered, acrosscomponent averages.

A group average of the stimulus identity conditions is presented in Figure 2.6B. Some
separation between the identities is visible in the P200 and N250 components, perhaps
consistent with a differential response to the extreme stimuli from the morph continuum
as compared to the center. As discussed previously, however, these effects may be
confounded by carry-over effects. For instance, a grand average waveform for the
“direct” effect of the 50% morph face is confounded by the fact that the 50% morph is,
on average, more often preceded by similar faces by virtue of its central location; and
thus more subject to adaptation. Similarly, a postulated differential response to the 50%
morph face compared to the extreme faces (a “direct” effect) might confound the nongeometric bias effects without concurrent modeling.
To examine direct effects in an unbiased manner, we obtained the beta values associated
with the amplitude of the ERP response to each face identity, after accounting for the
adaptation and bias effects. A repeated-measures ANOVA was then performed with each
identity covariate (0%, 25%, 50%, 75%, 100% Face B identities) and component (P100,
N170, P200, N250) as factors. A significant main effect of identity was found [F(4, 20) =
5.444, p = 0.004], but the interaction of identity and component was nonsignificant [F(12,
60) = 1.400, p = 0.191], suggesting this main effect of identity did not differentially
modulate any component in particular. Figure 2.6C presents the average across subjects
and components of the response to each face identity. The pattern of responses does not
correspond readily to a simple model of prototype or geometric effects.
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2.5 Discussion
Psychological models of perceptual proximity, the subjective judgment of “likeness”
between stimuli, have historically drawn a distinction between two factors or processes:
representation of simple metric distance between stimuli, and stimulus-specific bias.
Quantified in models such as the ‘additive similarity and bias’ model (Holman, 1979;
Nosofsky, 1991), this two-part framework separating geometric and non-geometric
effects has guided our understanding of how the visual system represents variation
between stimuli.
What are the neural correlates of these processes? We examined this question using a
continuous carry-over design (Aguirre, 2007) in ERP. Previously used in fMRI,
continuous carry-over designs allow measurement of graded neural adaptation, and
therefore better characterization of the neural representation of perceptual similarity
space. Using this paradigm with a set of ordered, morphed faces in ERP, we tested a dualeffects model of perceptual similarity against a temporal framework of early visual
evoked components previously associated with face processing.
Modeling transitions between stimulus presentations in terms of absolute metric distance
along our morphed face continuum, we found graded neural adaptation consistent with
metric stimulus similarity at a component between the N170 and N250 responses.
Modulation of the P200 was related to perceptual similarity, with greater positive
deflection for smaller perceptual distances (Figure 2.4). The temporal position of this
component suggests that computation of metric stimulus similarity begins within the first
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several hundred milliseconds of stimulus presentation, although after the earliest stages of
perceptual processing indexed by the P100 and N170 components. Adaptation of a
neuroimaging signal that is proportional to stimulus similarity can result from a cortical
region that codes stimulus identity by a population code (Aguirre, 2007; Drucker, Kerr, &
Aguirre, 2009). This suggests that, at the P200 stage, a neural population code for facial
identity is evoked that reflects geometric effects of similarity. It is also possible that
another neural mechanism apart from adaptation (e.g., a re-entrant masking effect;
Kotsoni, Csibra, Mareschal, & Johnson, 2007) is responsible for this parametric
modulation. In either case, these data are among the first to place a neural signature of
geometric similarity coding within a definite time window, arising as early as 200 ms
after stimulus presentation.
We also modeled the effects of asymmetric bias (Tversky, 1977; Op de Beeck et al.,
2003). Neural markers of such a non-geometric similarity effect were found for the N170
and N250 components (Figure 2.5). While both the N170 and N250 components show
sensitivity to asymmetric transitions positioned about the center of the stimulus space, the
P200 does not. Thus, not only have we found neural correlates of perceptual proximity
processing within relatively early stages of perceptual processing, but we also
demonstrate that the encoding of metric stimulus similarity and asymmetric bias are
temporally distinct.
Our model of non-geometric similarity effects is based upon the notion of a ‘prototype’
effect (Tversky, 1977; Op de Beeck et al., 2003). Two stimuli are perceived as more

!34

proximal when the more prototypical or average stimulus is presented following another
one less so, and less proximal in the reverse case. There are other non-geometric bias
effects that might be considered. In studies of magnitude estimation, for example, the
response to a stimulus tends to be larger when the preceding stimulus intensity was
greater. This “assimilation” effect is commonly seen for stimuli in which one end of the
continuum is “larger” (DeCarlo & Cross, 1990). The opposite, “contrast” effect is also
observed. A model for this directional bias in neuroimaging data is considered in Aguirre
(2007), and is orthogonal to the ‘prototype’ effect just discussed. While the ‘prototype’
model of bias is symmetric about the center of the stimulus space, directional bias is
inversely symmetric towards each extreme. Directional bias has been observed in
perceptual adaptation effects for face identity (Leopold, O'Toole, Vetter, & Blanz, 2001),
gender (Webster, Kaping, Mizokami, & Duhamel, 2004), and attractiveness (Rhodes,
Jeffery, Watson, Clifford, & Nakayama, 2003). We tested for directional bias effects in
our ERP study but found no significant effect (data not shown). This is not surprising as
our stimuli were a morph between two faces of equal distinctiveness, as opposed to the
stimuli of (e.g.) Leopold et al. (2001) in which one end of the continuum was a
distinctive face and the other a prototypical or average face.
A perceptual prototype may arise from long-term exposure to stimuli of a given class,
from the local context of a set of stimuli in an experiment, or both. Our study did not
distinguish between these two types of prototype. The center point of our stimulus
continuum may have achieved prototype status as it was a more “average” face in
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general, or because it was the central tendency of this particular stimulus set. These
possibilities might be distinguished through the use of an unbalanced face continuum in
which the “middle” face in the local context of the experimental set is not the most
average at the global level.
Related to this point, it is worth noting that while we observed neural prototype effects
for both the N170 and N250 components, it is possible that these distinct components are
related to different prototype effects. For the N170 in particular, we might expect that the
“prototype” effect reflects a local stimulus effect, driven by the experimental stimulus
space alone. Previous work has demonstrated a lack of adaptation in the N170 to withinclass features of faces, including eye-gaze direction (Schweinberger, Kloth, & Jenkins,
2007) and gender (Kloth, Schweinberger, & Kovács, 2009). These findings suggest that
the N170 adapts in a broad categorical fashion to faces and not to within-category
features, such as global face distinctiveness. Taken together with the apparent role of the
N170 in structural encoding (Bentin et al., 1996; Rossion et al., 2000), we would suggest
that the “prototype” effect observed in the N170 might reflect a rapid, implicit extraction
of local central tendency (i.e., within the experimental stimulus space). In contrast, as the
N250 is thought to reflect access to stored face representations (Tanaka et al., 2006), it is
possible that the non-geometric effect observed in this component indexes transitions
about a stored, global face “prototype”. While these interpretations rely on the
characteristics of the underlying components, future experiments which dissociate local
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and global face prototypes in the manner described above could characterize putatively
separable non-geometric similarity effects in a component-independent manner.
Finally, a notable methodological feature of this study was the concurrent measurement
and separation of the direct effects of each stimulus from carry-over effects of adaptation
and asymmetric bias. Without explicit modeling, these effects are confounded, rendering
it unclear whether effects reflect perceptual proximity per se, or a combination of
adaptation and identity effects. This potential confound exists in several studies of face
representation. For example, Loffler et al. (2005) used a block design in fMRI to
demonstrate increasing BOLD signal in the fusiform face area (FFA) in response to
groups of faces of increasing ‘distinctiveness’. The authors define ‘distinctiveness’ as
distance along putatively orthogonal identity axes extending from a central ‘mean’ face.
This design focuses primarily on non-geometric prototype and identity effects. However,
their observed decrease in BOLD signal for face blocks more proximal to the mean could
represent neural adaptation indexing geometric effects of metric distance, or some
combination of geometric and non-geometric effects.
Likewise, in an fMRI study using a similar facial identity morph continuum to ours, Jiang
et al. (2006) reported non-linear BOLD adaptation in response to increasing metric
distance. The authors interpreted this finding as suggesting that neural adaptation would
asymptote for greater metric stimulus distances, something we do not observe in our data.
In their experimental design, Jiang et al.(2006) use a traditional paired-presentation
paradigm with the adapting stimuli only located at the extreme of the morph continuum,
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and test stimuli at ∆30, ∆60 and ∆90 metric distances. It is possible with this design that
the unbalanced frequency of stimulus presentation introduces a non-geometric similarity
effect such as the ‘relative prominence’ bias presented by Johannesson (2000), or an
asymmetry driven by exposure frequency as presented by Polk et al. (2002). Thus while
Jiang et al. (2006) suggest their data reflects non-linear (asymptotic) encoding of metric
linear distance, our findings suggest their data could reflect a combination of geometric
effects and non-geometric effects.
2.6 Conclusions
Our results provide evidence for the dissociation in neural coding of non-geometric
‘prototype’ effects from the geometric effects of stimulus similarity, supporting
psychological models of the two elements as separate factors in the perception of
proximity. Using a continuous carry-over design in ERP, in conjunction with a principled
GLM approach to distinguish geometric and non-geometric processing, we find that these
different effects occur at discrete temporal stages of face processing. These findings
should expand our understanding of neural similarity, offer new avenues for exploring
global and local prototype effects, and encourage more careful consideration of the
complexity of stimulus space representations in the brain.
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3 Confounding of Norm-Based and Adaptation Effects in Brain
Responses
3.1 Abstract
Separate neuroscience experiments have examined two properties of neural coding for
perceptual stimuli. Adaptation studies seek a graded recovery from neural adaptation with
ever greater dissimilarity between pairs of stimuli. Studies of prototype effects test for a
larger absolute response to a stimulus which is distant from the center of a stimulus
space. While intellectually distinct, these effects are confounded in measurement in
standard neuroscience paradigms and can be mistaken for one another. Stimuli which are
more distinctive are less subject to adaptation from perceptual neighbors. Therefore, a
putative prototype effect may simply result from greater adaptation of prototypical
stimuli by other stimuli in the experiment. Conversely, stimulus pairs which are the most
perceptually distant from one another, and therefore expected to show the greatest
recovery from adaptation, disproportionately draw from the extremes of the stimulus
space. Thus, a putative neural similarity effect may be created by an underlying prototype
representation. We simulate BOLD fMRI results driven by each possible effect and
demonstrate spurious results in support of the complementary effect. We then present an
example fMRI experiment that demonstrates the confound and how it may be minimized.
Finally, we discuss the implications of this intrinsic confound for studies of perceptual
representation, neural coding, and category learning.
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3.2 Introduction
A common target of neuroscience studies is the form of neural coding used to represent
variation in stimulus properties. Very often, such studies use stimuli with linear variation
along a single dimension. Examples of these “morphed” stimuli include facial image
morphs of identity (Freeman et al., 2010, Jiang et al., 2006, Kahn et al., 2010) or
emotional expression (Said et al., 2010a), mathematically defined abstract shapes (Panis
et al., 2010, De Baene & Vogels, 2010), or auditory cues (Latinus et al., 2011).
Within the broad category of distributed neural encoding models (Barlow, 1972,
Edelman, 1998), perceptual variation can be expected to have several neural correlates.
Norm-based encoding models (Leopold et al., 2001, Rhodes and Jeffery, 2006) postulate
that variation relative to a reference point in a stimulus space results in differential
absolute responses to stimuli. These differences may take the form of a “prototype” effect
(Valentine, 1991): a reduction in the neural response to a centrally-oriented prototype
relative to those stimuli that are more extremely positioned. However, other distributed
encoding models are possible, including those in which a stimulus space is represented
using tuning functions that do not depend upon a particular point of space as a reference.
In such a case, as in all distributed encoding models, perceptual variation could be
indexed by the overlap in neural populations constituting two distributed representations.
One manifestation of this form of neural representation is an “adaptation” effect (GrillSpector & Malach, 2001; Henson & Rugg, 2003): a reduction in the neural response to a
stimulus resulting from recent presentation of an identical or related stimulus. As defined,
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these two effects of encoding are intellectually distinct and based upon related and welldefined schema for neural representation.
Testing for these two effects of perceptual variation is possible via neuroimaging.
Prototype effects, hypothesized to manifest as a larger bulk neural response to extreme
stimuli, have been observed using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) in
response to faces (Freeman et al., 2010; Loffler et al., 2005; Said et al., 2010a), face
profile silhouettes (Davidenko et al., 2011) and abstract shapes (Panis et al., 2010).
Similar findings have been demonstrated in monkey electrophysiological recordings
(Leopold et al., 2006). Adaptation effects, a form of “carry-over” effect of one stimulus
upon another (Aguirre, 2007), manifest as an increasing reduction in neural response for
the latter stimulus in a sequentially-presented pair as a function of the pair’s dissimilarity
in fMRI (Drucker et al., 2009, Jiang et al., 2006) and ERP (Kahn et al., 2010). Graded
neural adaptation related to stimulus similarity has been demonstrated in MEG (Furl et
al., 2007) and in neuronal firing in monkey electrophysiology studies (De Baene &
Vogels, 2010).
Despite being coherent and distinct predictions of neural models, we show here that these
effects are confounded in measurement, and thus can be mistaken for one another.
Importantly, while counter-balance (Aguirre et al., 2011) in the order of stimulus
presentation is ultimately necessary to address this confound, it is not sufficient to
remove it.
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3.3 An Example Stimulus Space
Consider a simple experiment that presents stimuli in a counter-balanced order from a set
of five, evenly spaced morphed faces (Figure 3.1A; morphs created using Photoshop
CS5.5, Adobe; & JPsychoMorph). We may then ask if different face morphs have
systematically different relationships to the set of stimuli as a whole.
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Figure 3.1: Consequences of a
counterbalanced experimental design
with a 5-exemplar morph space
(a) An example stimulus set
consisting of the two authors of this
paper morphed in 5 equal steps. The
average distance of all possible
transitions from the central face is
less than that from either extreme
face. (b) Relative representation of
each stimulus in every possible
transition distance for a
counterbalanced stimulus sequence.
Transition distance is measured as
the number of steps within the
stimulus space between the
preceding and current stimuli.

Faces from the center of the space will, on average, be preceded and followed by faces
which are more similar: on average, there will be a transition of 1.2 positions within the
stimulus space from a center stimulus to the prior or next stimulus in the sequence
(Figure 3.1A). In contrast, faces from the ends of the stimulus space will have transition
sizes of 2.0 positions from sequentially adjacent trials on average. Thus, the position of
the stimulus within the space is related to the size of transitions in which it is involved. If
different neural responses attended stimulus transitions of different sizes, this relationship
would produce different average neural amplitudes to the different faces, even if the
neural responses to the faces themselves were identical. This is a mechanism by which
neural adaptation to stimulus similarity alone might be mistaken for a prototype effect.
This can be appreciated in the complementary analysis as well (Figure 3.1B). Consider
the sizes of transitions that are available between the faces in the experiment. Only
stimuli from the ends of the space can be involved in the largest transitions. Conversely,
small transitions disproportionately involve the faces from the center of the space. If the
faces from the ends of the stimulus space evoked larger neural responses than faces from
the center, this relationship would produce different average neural responses to the
transitions of different sizes, even if there was no effect of transition size itself upon
neural response. This is a mechanism by which prototype effects alone might be
mistaken for neural adaptation to stimulus similarity.
We note that the first of these concerns has been recognized previously (Panis et al.,
2010; Davidenko et al., 2011). We expand upon these previous observations by
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highlighting the reciprocal nature of this confound (which affects more than just studies
of norm-based encoding), describing steps to mitigate the problem, and illustrating the
explanatory potential when this complexity is embraced by experimental designs rather
than eliminated.
3.4 A Simulated Experiment
We conducted a simulation of an experiment that uses a linear morph space. Following
the parameters of a recent study of prototype representation (Panis et al., 2010), we
created a sequence for presentation of five stimuli (along with blank trials) using
OptSeq2 (NMR Center; Massachusetts General Hospital, Boston, MA).1 An inter-trialinterval of 2000 msecs was assumed.
We first simulated the case in which a neural population has norm-based (prototype)
coding for the stimuli, but no neural adaptation takes place. Figure 3.2A (top row) shows
the “carry-over matrix” (Aguirre, 2007) which characterizes the neural response to a
given stimulus as a function of the prior stimulus. As can be seen, the modeled neural
response is entirely determined by the identity of the current stimulus (“direct” effects).
The particular amplitudes of response used were taken from the measure of a behavioral
prototype effect (Upper left panel of Figure 4 of Panis et al., 2010).

1

While the optseq program offers “preoptimized first-order counterbalancing”, it does
not actually provide perfect counter-balance of the stimuli (Aguirre et al., 2011). This has
no consequence for the didactic purpose of our simulation, but would complicate
attempts to remedy the confound within a linear model.
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Figure 3.2: A simulation of fMRI BOLD response demonstrating confounding of
prototype and similarity effects.
TOP ROW (a) A neural response model in which only prototype effects are postulated,
with extreme stimuli resulting in a greater bulk response. The amplitude of neural
response is driven entirely by the current stimulus with no modulation by preceding
stimuli. (b) Simulated BOLD response for a counterbalanced stimulus presentation driven
by prototype effects (grey). The model fit (red) represents a covariate modeling a linear
adaptation effect for transition distance but not the prototype effect driving the data. (c) A
spurious linear neural adaptive effect of similarity resulting from solely un-modeled
prototype effects. BOTTOM ROW (a) A neural response model in which only stimulus
similarity effects are present, with large transitions resulting in the greatest neural
response (recovery-from-adaptation) and repetitions yielding the smallest. Individual
responses are a function of the distance of the prior stimulus to the current stimulus (b)
Simulated BOLD response for a counterbalanced stimulus presentation driven by
similarity effects (grey). The model fit (red) represents a covariate modeling a prototype
effect for transition distance but not the similarity effect driving the data. (c) A spurious
effect of prototype resulting from solely un-modeled neural adaptive effects.
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Given the sequence of stimuli and the matrix of neural responses, a simulated BOLD
fMRI signal was generated (grey line, top row, Figure 3.2B) using an assumed
hemodynamic response function (Aguirre et al., 1998).
We then analyzed the simulated data using a model that tested only for the presence of
neural adaptation effects, and ignored the possibility of a prototype effect. In the model,
covariates were generated to model transitions between the stimuli of different step sizes.
As can be seen, the model of a non-existent neural effect fit a substantial portion of
variance in the simulated BOLD data (red line, top row, Figure 3.2B). A plot of the
loading on the model covariates reveals a spurious effect that could easily be mistaken for
a linear neural adaptation effect (top row, Figure 3.2C). Therefore, in data that contain
only “prototype” neural effects, a spurious neural adaptation effect might be found.
Next, we simulated the case in which a neural population scales the amplitude of
response dependent upon the similarity of the prior stimulus in the sequence, but which
has equal responses to all the stimuli in isolation (Figure 3.2A, bottom row). Again,
simulated BOLD fMRI data were generated. These data were then modeled assuming that
only direct effects of the stimuli are present in the data, and ignoring any possible neural
adaptation. Separate covariates were fit to the average neural response to each stimulus
identity (Figure 3.2C, bottom row). The result (Figure 3.2C, bottom row) is a spurious
“prototype” effect, in which larger amplitude neural responses are measured for the
stimuli from the extremes of the stimulus range. Therefore, in data that contain only
neural adaptation effects, a spurious “prototype” effect may be measured.
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3.5 An Empirical Example
We next collected fMRI data from one participant (naive to the hypotheses of this study)
to demonstrate these spurious effects in practice, and mitigation of the confound through
concurrent modeling of both effects. Stimuli were 5 radial frequency contours (RFCs; Op
de Beeck et al., 2001) created along a linear axis of varying RFC-phase and amplitude,
and rendered with a pseudorandom black checkerboard texture on a gray background.
The stimuli, subtending 5˚ x 5˚ of visual angle, were back projected onto a screen and
viewed by the subject via a head coil mounted mirror. The five stimuli, an additional
target stimulus (an RFC orthogonally related to the morphed stimuli), and a blank trial
were presented in sequences defined by second-order counterbalanced k=7, n=3, de
Bruijn cycles (Aguirre et al., 2011). Each of 4 runs consisted of 343 continuous trials.
Trials consisted of a 900 msec stimulus presentation followed by a 200 msec interstimulus interval of a grey blank screen (Figure 3.3A). The duration of all blank trials was
either doubled or tripled pseudorandomly to fit the 343 trials to 154 TRs. The subject was
directed to monitor for the appearance of the target stimulus and respond with a button
press. Echo-planar BOLD fMR images were collected (TR = 3 sec), with 3 mm isotropic
voxels on a Siemens 3-T Trio with a 8-channel head coil. A functional localizer (Harris &
Aguirre, 2008) consisting of faces, objects, buildings, and phase-scrambled images was
also run for use in region-of-interest (ROI) definition. We defined an ROI corresponding
to the left ventral lateral occipital complex (LOC) that had a significantly greater
response to objects and faces (as compared to buildings and scrambled images) and a
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significant response to the average (main effect) of all shape stimuli in the primary
experiment as compared to a blank screen (Figure 3.3B). The response to the different
RFC shapes and their transitions were obtained within this ROI.
The raw data were sinc-interpolated in time to correct for slice acquisition order and
motion corrected using least squares minimization. The effects of adaptation and
prototype in the data, both in isolation and concurrently, were analyzed using a modified
general linear model (Worsley & Friston, 1995). After accounting for serial correlation in
the residuals and the covariates used, the statistical tests we report below had
approximately 110 effective degrees of freedom.
Our first model contained covariates only for adaptation, without differences in absolute
response to individual stimuli modeled. Four covariates modeled the possible step sizes
from the prior stimulus to the current stimulus (∆1 through ∆4, as in Figure 3.1; identical
stimulus repetitions, ∆0, served as a reference condition for the entire model to avoid
over-fitting of the model to the data). Additional covariates modeled the main effect of
stimulus presentation versus the blank trials, targets, transitions from blanks to a
stimulus, and the whole-brain global signal. The weightings on these covariates are
presented in Figure 3.3C, top-left panel. A significant effect of step size, (evaluated
simply as a t-test for [Step 4 - Step 1]; t = 3.46, p = 0.0004) is present in this analysis, but
is subject to potential confound of norm-based effects.
A complementary analysis modeled only the “direct” effect of each stimulus. Four
covariates were fit the response to the presentation of each non-target stimulus,
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Figure 3.3: An analysis of empirical fMRI data demonstrating both confounded and
unconfounded measurement of adaptation and prototype effects
(a) Experimental design. Individual trials consisted of a stimulus presentation of 900 ms
followed by a blank screen ISI of 200 ms. Trials proceeded continuously while the
subject monitored for the appearance of an unrelated target shape (not shown). (b) The
region of interest (ROI) used for statistical analysis, 50 voxels in ventral LOC, defined
using an independent localizer comparison of [(Faces, Objects) - (Buildings & Scrambled
Images), t > 4] crossed with a main effect of [Shapes, t > 4]. (c) TOP ROW Beta values
from general linear models for covariates modeling the adaptive effects of transition
distance. All values are mean-centered, One the left, the effects of stimulus identity are
un-modeled in the GLM. On the right, the effects of both adaptation and identity are
modeled concurrently. With concurrent modeling, the strength of the adaptive effect can
be quantified without confound. BOTTOM ROW Beta values from a GLM for covariates
modeling stimulus identity, indexed to the central stimulus. One the left, the effects of
adaptation are un-modeled in the GLM. On the right, both effects are modeled
concurrently. With concurrent modeling, the trend of a prototype effect is no longer
present.
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referenced to the central stimulus. The additional covariates included in the model were
the same as that for the prior, “adaptation only” analysis. The covariate weights for this
model are presented in Figure 3.3C, bottom-left panel. The presence of a norm-based
effect of prototype should manifest as a greater response for the extreme stimuli relative
to the central stimulus. A t-test for [(stimulus 1 - stimulus 3) + (stimulus 5 - stimulus 3)]
in this one subject showed an effect in this direction (t = 1.18, p = 0.12). Thus a normbased effect of prototype could be present, but is similarly subject to confound due to unmodeled effects of adaptation.
A third model contained both sets of covariates. The resulting beta values are presented in
Figure 3.3C, right panels. When controlling for the effect of prototype, the carry-over
effects of adaptation observed in previous GLM remain in the larger model (evaluated as
before, t = 3.59, p = 0.0002). However, when these carry-over effects are modeled in
parallel, the suggestive trend of a norm-based effect of prototype, with the extreme
stimuli yielding greater response than the central stimulus, is no longer present (t = -1.17,
p = 0.87).
The ventral region we examined is close to that previously reported to manifest
proportional adaptation for two-dimensional closed contours (Drucker & Aguirre, 2009),
and which is not thought to demonstrate significant norm-based effects of prototype
(Panis et al., 2010).
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With these data, we present an empirical example of the confound of adaptation effects
and norm-based effects. We demonstrate that in the same data, incomplete modeling can
lead to spurious effects for which complete modeling can account.
3.6 Implications For Other Studies
We simulated and measured this confound in a particular experimental design that
presented the stimuli in a counter-balanced order, but it is present in other studies as well.
In an fMRI study, Jiang et al. (2006) argued in favor of a non-linear trend in recovery
from adaptation as a function of stimulus dissimilarity. The authors presented a series of
facial stimulus pairs of varying inter-stimulus distances drawn from a linear morph space,
and observed the predicted recovery-from-adaptation. However, as the authors used only
an extremely-positioned stimulus as the adapting stimulus, and an uneven selection of
test stimuli, it is possible that their measures of recovery-from-adaptation were
confounded by un-modeled effects of prototypicality.
In another fMRI study, Loffler et al. (2005) presented blocks of faces varying in
distinctiveness from an average face. The authors demonstrated an increase in neural
response for blocks of faces further from the average face, a finding which was presented
in support of a mean-centric direct effect. While the prototype explanation is possible, the
experimental design is confounded in that faces more similar to a prototype are
geometrically less distinct. Blocks of more prototypical faces would thus be subject to
greater neural adaptation, yielding a reduction in response amplitude driven by carry-over
effects. Davideko et al. (2011) subsequently used an elegant stimulus manipulation to call
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this result into question. Within blocks of stimuli, they manipulated the distinctiveness of
parameterized face silhouettes while controlling the physical variability of the stimuli in
the block. While this stimulus manipulation removes the confound, it does not provide a
generalized solution to the joint examination of distributed and norm-based neural
coding.
A similar stimulus set was used by Leopold et al. (2006) during electrophysiological
recordings of inferotemporal cortex in monkeys. The authors demonstrated increased
neural activity for faces further from the average face in support of a norm-based
encoding model. While it is difficult to assess the potential for confound, (indeed,
different experimental methods can minimize this potential, as we will discuss) this study
demonstrates that stimulus sets vulnerable to confounding of prototype and adaptation are
not limited to human neuroimaging.
The confound of prototype and adaptation effects will have a more subtle effect in multivoxel pattern analysis (MVPA) studies that make use of one-dimensional stimulus sets
(Said et al., 2010b). In this case, the uncertainty regards the form of neural representation
that is used to decode the stimuli. MVPA studies make use of the pattern of direct-effects
across voxels (the average response to a given stimulus across presentations). The ability
of an MVPA analysis to classify the identity of a stimulus from the pattern of activity
may not be the consequence of a difference in the neural response to the stimulus itself,
but instead as a consequence of differences in relative neural adaptation.
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Finally, a confound between norm-based and adaptation measures has implications for
studies of category formation as well. A common hypothesis predicts enhanced recoveryfrom-adaptation for a stimulus transition of a given distance that crosses a perceptual
category boundary, relative to a transition of the same distance that does not cross a
category boundary (Goldstone, 1994). However, as category boundaries typically bisect a
stimulus space (and large stimulus transitions crossing the boundary have no withincategory analog), stimulus transitions crossing the category boundary will preferentially
sample stimuli from the center of the space, while within-category transitions will
involve more extremely positioned stimuli. In such a case, a smaller bulk response to
centrally-oriented stimuli due to norm-based coding effects could negate or even reverse
the predicted alteration in adaptation effects driven by a category boundary. Indeed, we
are aware of results from our lab (and others) that demonstrate this reversal and have to
date remained unpublished due to puzzlement regarding the cause and interpretation.
It is important to emphasize that the acknowledgment of this confound does not negate
the presence of a neural effect in the studies we cite. Instead, this confound leads to
uncertainty regarding the precise form of neural coding that produced a measured neural
response.
3.7 Mitigation of Confound
With an understanding of the potential of confound between adaptation and direct effects,
we can consider several steps that may be taken to mitigate the problem. It should be
noted that the study we used as a model for our simulation (Panis et al., 2010) is also a
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model example of awareness of this possible confound. The authors considered the
possibility of adaptation effects in their data, and conducted an appropriate post-hoc test
(effectively, a measure of carry-over for some stimulus pairings).
Similarly, Davidenko et al. (2011) anticipated the possibility of adaptation effects
yielding spurious prototype effects in a block design study similar to Loffler et al. (2005).
The authors mitigated the effect of stimulus variation upon their measurement by
matching variability within block while varying prototypicality across block. For blockdesign studies, this method is a appropriate mitigation of the confound. We describe
below additional, and more comprehensive, responses to this confound.
Principally, covariates for prototype and neural similarity effects (more generally, direct
and carry-over effects) should be included in the same general linear model. As our
empirical example demonstrates, the presence of either effect may then be measured after
accounting for the confounding regularities that exist in the order of stimulus presentation
(see also, e.g., Kahn et al., 2010). The use of a fully counter-balanced stimulus sequence
(Aguirre et al., 2011) is crucial, as this allows the two types of effects to be estimated
efficiently and without bias (De Carlo et al., 1990).2
A limitation of this solution is that the degree of correlation between direct and carry-over
effects can become substantial, particularly in fMRI studies which are affected by the
2

Our paper which introduced the notion of simultaneous modeling of direct and carryover effects in neuroimaging (Aguirre 2007) erroneously states that “direct and carryover effects are orthogonal when the order of presentation of stimuli is serially first-order
balanced”. While this is true for the forms of neural response considered in that paper, the
current work demonstrates that it is not a true statement generally, as confounds do exist
for some forms of response.
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temporal filtering properties of the hemodynamic response. Careful design of stimulus
sequences can enhance power for measurement of carry-over effects (Aguirre et al.,
2011), improving the ability to model carry-over effects for measurement or removal.
More broadly, a model that includes both carry-over and direct effects may be assessed
with an omnibus F-test without negative consequences of correlation within the
covariates. This test would reveal that the neural signal does code for the stimuli or their
relationship without determining the relative contribution of these effects.
One means of avoiding this issue is through the design of stimulus spaces. For example,
stimuli drawn from a circle within a two-dimensional space are not subject to this
confound, as every stimulus is equidistant from the (prototypical) center of the space. Of
course, a downside to such a design is the inability to present a stimulus in the center of
the space, thus precluding the study of norm-based coding.
Finally, experimental design may be used to minimize the presence of carry-over effects
within the data. For example, a sparse fMRI design with long inter-stimulus intervals
(e.g., greater than 6 seconds) would both plausibly reduce adaptation effects and reduce
the degree of confound. Stimulus masking may be used to similar effect. The
effectiveness of these measures for the reduction of carry-over effects would be an
empirical question, with measurement of the effect subject to the same confounds
discussed.
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3.8 Discussion
We have explored a particular confound in the study of perceptual variation and stimulus
representations. While individual neuroimaging studies have sought evidence for either
prototype or adaptation effects in relation to neural encoding schemes, we find that these
have the potential to be confused. We further demonstrate this confound empirically, and
find that spurious effects can arise with incomplete modeling of fMRI data.
While this confound does not negate the existence of claimed neural effects, it may call
into question their interpretation. As we have recommended, researchers interested in
solely norm-based or adaptation effects have several avenues toward isolation of their
effect of interest. We would argue, however, that instead of striving to solely mitigate one
effect or the other, a more holistic perspective toward neural coding effects and their
interaction could be useful.
As we have discussed, the concept of a prototype effect is related to a differential
absolute response to a central stimulus relative to an extreme one. We can classify these
prototype effects as a type of first-order effect of representation - one related to the
unique neural response to a stimulus. Adaptation effects pertain to the overlap between
distributed neural responses and arise from comparisons of stimuli - a type of secondorder effect of representation.
The preservation of both the uniqueness of each stimulus, and the relationships of stimuli
to each other is thought to be a primary goal of perceptual representation. In psychology,
these two features are captured in the concept of a stimulus space - a representation of
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both stimulus identity and stimulus relationships. Stimulus spaces posit a unique location
for each exemplar, with distances within space as an index of stimulus similarity. In
relating this conceptual space to neural representations, it is possible to reframe prototype
and adaptation effects. First-order effects of prototypicality speak to the position within a
stimulus space, and second-order effects of similarity (e.g. adaptation) speak to distance.
The concept of a stimulus space goes further than these simple features; such spaces have
topology. In his classic psychological observation, Amos Tversky (1977) highlighted that
similarity relationships were prone to asymmetry, particularly in comparisons involving
prototypes. For example, most observers judge an ellipse to be more like a circle, than a
circle to be like an ellipse. Such asymmetries can be understood as slopes in the surfaces
of a stimulus space, biasing an otherwise equal metric relationship toward one direction.
These slopes create a surface topology oriented about the prototype that has both secondorder and first-order consequences.
On the second-order, surface topology would result in biases of adaptation effects in the
direction of the prototype. Just as metric similarity has a neural adaptive effect, so does
this asymmetric bias. As demonstrated by Kahn et al. (2010) in an ERP study, differential
adaptation in the N170 and N250 evoked potentials occurs for comparisons of
prototypical and extreme faces dependent upon the order of comparison - a second-order
effect of prototype. Notably, this finding would be impossible without simultaneous
modeling of first-order prototype effects and second-order similarity effects.
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On the first-order, surface topology would result in differential elevation of two points in
the stimulus space. As the topological slopes are oriented toward prototypical stimuli, the
elevation, and therefore absolute neural response to prototypical stimuli would be
reduced relative to extreme stimuli - exactly the prediction of norm-based encoding
models. Thus thinking in terms of stimulus space topology highlights several of the
dominant effects of representation currently researched.
The cohesion of the topological stimulus space model lends itself to one more avenue of
investigation, namely the dynamics of this space, and the interactions which might drive
changes in topology. Importantly, Panis et al. (2010) offered evidence in favor of a
dynamic prototype effect. Were the dual effects of prototype and stimulus similarity
modeled in parallel, it might have been possible to disentangle both the first- and secondorder effects of stimuli, as well as the interaction of the two in driving the dynamics of
the other.
We believe this is a promising area of investigation. It is possible that second-order
effects of neural adaptation are instrumental in the molding of prototype effects in the
short and long term. One prediction is that the pattern of neural adaptation effects across
the course of an experiment changes in concert with the emergence of the dynamic
prototype, as suggested by Panis et al. (2010).
The conclusions of this paper are therefore two-fold. In regard recent neuroimaging
studies, we highlight a confound of stimulus effects which draw into question existing
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interpretations. We also suggest a more cohesive approach to investigating neural
stimulus spaces that enables study of the dynamics of perceptual representation.
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4 A Single Temporal Integration Mechanism Unites Neural Adaptation
and Prototype Formation
4.1 Abstract
What information is encoded in a cortical visual representation?
That visual representations are distributed across the ventral temporal cortex is well
established. fMRI adaptation studies demonstrate these neural codes are modulated by the
perceptual similarity of sequential stimuli. Studies investigating prototype-based coding
effects propose that neural responses are proportional to distinctiveness from a central
reference, or prototype. In existing fMRI work, these two effects are considered
independently. We propose here that these two effects arise as a consequence of a single
mechanism of coding based upon temporal integration over recent stimulus history.
Using a carry-over fMRI design, we show significant neural adaptation and prototypebased coding effects in a face-responsive region of interest in the right fusiform gyrus
when effects are modeled discretely. By considering these effects as extremes of a single
drifting norm model, we find that visual representations tend to encode identity in terms
of intermediate stimulus history. Looking beyond the region of interest, we demonstrate
that the effect of temporal context varies smoothly across the cortex, with the modulatory
effect of recent visual history extending further back in time in a posterior to anterior
fashion along the right ventral temporal cortex.
These findings reframe two branches of the visual representation literature in terms of a
unified encoding model. Importantly, this finding offers a perspective on the cortical
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topology of visual identity representations. We discuss the implications of this gradient as
an organizing principle of the ventral visual topology.
4.2 Introduction
The responses of neural populations are modulated both by systematic variations in
stimulus properties, as well as by the recent history of stimuli.
The distinctiveness of a stimulus is a behaviorally relevant and much studied dimension
of stimulus variation that impacts neural response. A graded increase in bulk neural
response to stimuli that are increasingly different from a central, “prototype” stimulus is
seen in both BOLD fMRI (Loffler et al., 2005; Panis et al., 2011; Davidenko et al., 2011)
and single unit electrophysiological recordings (Leopold et al., 2006, De Baene et al.,
2007). These results are taken as evidence that neurons implement a “norm-based” code
that represents stimulus exemplars with respect to a stored representation of a centrally
positioned prototype (Leopold et al., 2001; Rhodes & Jeffery, 2006). Quantitatively, the
magnitude of norm-based neural responses is found to be proportional to the distance of
the currently presented stimulus from the center of a multi-dimensional stimulus space
from which the stimuli are drawn (Anderson & Wilson, 2005; Loffler et al., 2005).
The effect of the history of presented stimuli upon the perception and neural
representation of the currently presented stimulus is also a topic of great interest. Neural
adaptation effects are the primary example of this influence of stimulus history as studied
in electrophysiologic and functional neuroimaging studies (Grill-Spector & Malach,
2001). In these experiments, the repetition of an immediately preceding stimulus
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produces a reduced neural response to the subsequent presentation. Adaptation effects are
found to parametrically vary with the similarity between stimuli (Drucker & Aguirre,
2009, Jiang et al., 2006). Specifically, the adaptation of neural response is found to be
proportional to the distance of the currently presented stimulus from the previously
presented stimulus within a multi-dimensional stimulus space.
It is interesting to observe that both norm-based and adaptation effects are related to
distance within a representational stimulus space, with the precise magnitude of the effect
relative to the position of the prior stimulus, or to the center of the stimulus space. For
norm-based studies, a recent question is how the stored prototype that resides at the
center of the stimulus space is initially generated (Tsao & Freiwald 2006). Clearly, this is
an effect of stimulus history, but one with a potential influence of the lifetime of sensory
experiences. Recent findings, however, suggest that the formation of the central prototype
is a more dynamic process operating on shorter time scales. In a study of novel abstract
shapes (Panis et al., 2011), norm-based neural effects were observed when distinctiveness
was defined over the course of an experimental run.
The current literature would suggest that both neural adaptation and norm-based
responses are properties of neural systems, each with some sensitivity to the history of
presented stimuli, but operating at very different timescales. Could it be, however, that
instead of two separate mechanisms, there is a single, intermediate representation of
recent stimulus history that can account for both effects? What would be the nature of
such an effect?
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Consider the simplest example of the sequential presentation of three stimuli. According
to a neural adaptation model, the response to the second stimulus will be larger
proportional to its perceptual distance from the first, and the response to the third
stimulus will be scaled by its perceptual distance to the second. If response modulation
were to accumulate according to a monotonically decreasing function of stimulus history,
the response to the third stimulus would be modulated by the distance to the prior
stimulus and partially by the distance to the first - in effect a modulation relative to a
norm which resides in between the two preceding stimuli. In the context of a longer
stimulus presentation, the same rationale can be applied, leading to the prediction of a
drifting norm in perceptual space. The drifting norm represents the temporally integrated
stimulus history, and serves as a reference point from which the degree of neural response
modulation is proportional. Indeed, any exponentially decaying model of neural
adaptation is, in principle, a model of a drifting norm.
Here, we test the hypothesis that a single mechanism of temporal integration of stimulus
history can account for both neural adaptation and prototype effects in fMRI measures of
face perception. To test this hypothesis, we began by replicating prior findings of normbased and neural adaptive effects in isolated models within a face-responsive region of
interest. We find that both effects are present in our data. We then examine whether a
drifting norm model better accounts for the variation in fMRI responses to faces than
other models of stimulus history effects. We show that, within a region where both neural
adaptation and norm-based effects can be measured, a drifting norm model corresponding
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to an intermediate temporal integration window best explains the variation of BOLD
fMRI response to a stream of face stimuli. We then go on to investigate how the horizon
of the observed temporal integration effect varies across the ventral cortical visual
pathway.
4.3 Methods
4.3.1 Participants
A total of 41 subjects contributed data to either Dataset #1 or Dataset #2. From a total of
20 subjects enrolled in Dataset #1, one subject was discarded because of lost behavioral
data, one subject for not responding in more than 15% trials, and three discarded for
excessive head motion, leaving fifteen subjects (twelve right handed, ten female, aged
19-25 years) whose data were analyzed. From a total of 21 subjects enrolled in Dataset
#2, two subjects were discarded for excessive head motion, leaving nineteen subjects
whose data were analyzed. All subjects provided informed consent and the study protocol
was approved by the Institutional Review Board of the University of Pennsylvania.
4.3.2 Scanning
Magnetic resonance images were obtained at 3.0-T on a Siemens Trio equipped with an
8-channel head coil at the Hospital of the University of Pennsylvania. T1-weighted
structural images (160 axial slices, voxel size = 0.98 x 0.98 x 1.00 mm) were collected
using a 3D magnetization-prepared rapid gradient-echo pulse sequence. During
experimental runs, blood-oxygenation level dependent (BOLD) functional images were
collected using an echo-planar pulse sequence (time repetition [TR] = 3 sec, time echo
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[TE] = 3 ms, voxel size = 3.00 mm isotropic). Functional data were acquired with 64 x 64
in-plane resolution across 45 axial slices. Pre-processing of the functional data involved
sinc-interpolation in time to correct for the slice acquisition order and motion corrected
using least squares minimization. The MPRAGE image from each subject was
reconstructed in surface space and mapped to the fsaverage template using FreeSurfer;
functional data were transformed to the surface space and smoothed with a 10mm
FWHM kernel.
4.3.3 Stimuli and Experimental Design
Two sets of synthetic facial stimuli were created for Datasets #1 and #2 using GenHead
(version 1.2, Genemation). Each stimulus set was created with 3 primary axes with 3
points along each axis, resulting in 27 distinct stimuli. For Dataset #1, the three axes were
gender, race, and internal facial features (Figure 4.1A) and for Dataset #2, the axes were
skin tone, facial thickness, and facial identity (Figure 4.2C inset); stimuli in the second
dataset were physically less distinct than the first dataset. All stimuli were created in an
“older” and “younger” version; this orthogonal fourth dimension was used in the
scanning cover task.
Stimuli were presented using a carry-over design20. Each trial lasted 1500 msec (1400
msec stimulus, 100 msec blank screen). Blank trials, in which no stimulus was presented,
were also counterbalanced and doubled in length to 3000 msec. Stimuli, subtending 5˚x5˚
of visual angle, were back-projected onto a screen and viewed by subjects via a head
coil-mounted mirror. On each stimulus trial, the presented face was randomly set to
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appear in the “older” or “younger” version. Subjects were directed to judge the age of
each face and respond. A linear four button response box was held with both hands; a
dual-thumb outer button press corresponded to a younger face judgment, and a dualthumb inner button press to older faces. All but 4 subjects in both datasets performed
above chance on this perceptually demanding attention task. Subjects were instructed to
withhold a response on blank trials. The percentage of trials for which the subject failed
to respond was taken as an index of poor attention to the stimuli. Prior to scanning,
subjects performed a brief pilot session of twenty-five trials during which they practiced
the age judgment task with the same stimuli used in the scanning experiments and
received feedback.
4.3.4 Stimulus Sequence
Trial order was determined by Type-1, Index-1 (k = 28), first-order counterbalanced
sequences (optimized as described in Appendix B of Aguirre 2007 20). For Dataset #1, the
same sequence was used for all subjects, while for Dataset #2 a different sequence was
used for each subject. As blank trials were doubled in duration, the total number of
effective trials analyzed was 1624 (812 TRs).
The total sequence was spread over six functional scans of 141 TRs each. To allow for
appropriate adaptive context to be achieved at the beginning of each run, the last 10
stimuli (5 TRs) from the preceding run were presented at the beginning of each scan (for
the first run, the final 10 stimuli in the sequence were presented). The first 5 TRs of each
scan were discarded during pre-processing. For the final scan, the sequence completed
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prior to completion, and thus the last 4 TRs of the scan were discarded. Thus, 136 images
from the first five scans and 132 from the last run were analyzed.
4.3.5 Behavioral Assessment of Stimulus Similarity
Each subject performed a set of explicit judgments of similarity for the pairs of faces
following MRI scanning. Each pairing of faces was rated on a scale from 1 to 10 (1 being
identical, 10 being completely different). For Dataset #1, similarity ratings provided by
different subjects were strongly concordant (the average correlation of each subject to the
remainder of the group was 0.75). Consistent ratings were obtained for both old and
young face sets (average between set correlation was 0.95). These similarity ratings were
z-transformed within subject, averaged across subjects, scaled between 0 and 1, and
entered into a multi-dimensional scaling analysis in Matlab (Mathworks, Natick, MA).
The first three dimensions of the result defined the behavioral stimulus space (Figure
4.1A) used for subsequent analysis. This 3-dimensional MDS solution explained 70% of
the variance in the behavioral data. A second behavioral experiment using implicit
measures of perceptual similarity (inverse reaction time in a discrimination task) yielded
a highly correlated result (correlation of implicit and explicit group similarity matrices =
0.79).
The same analyses were conducted for face stimuli for Dataset #2, though only 14 of the
scanned subjects were available to provide similarity data. For the explicit similarity data,
the average correlation of each subject to the average of the group was 0.67. A second
behavioral experiment using implicit measures of perceptual similarity (inverse reaction
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time in a discrimination task) yielded a highly correlated result (correlation of implicit
and explicit group similarity matrices = 0.86).
4.3.6 ROI Definition
A one-sample group (across subject) mean GLM was run on the main effect of stimuli
versus the blank screen. The result was masked with the FreeSurfer fusiform label, and
then the top 800 vertices in the right hemisphere selected to define a region of interest
(ROI). The average signal across vertices was obtained for each subject and then further
examined.
4.3.7 General Linear Model
The central hypothesis of the study is that the neural response to the sequence of face
stimuli is best explained by a drifting norm model. In this conception, neural response is
modulated in a carry-over fashion by the similarity of the presented stimulus to a single
drifting norm - the current integrated representational context of the neural system. The
drifting norm (x) is expressed as a position within the 3-dimensional MDS stimulus space
defined by behavioral measures. For the first trial, the drifting norm is arbitrarily set to
the center of the stimulus space. The norm position is then updated by the presentation of
stimuli (s), which draw the norm towards the position of the current stimulus in the
perceptual space. The degree to which the norm drifts in response to a stimulus
presentation is determined a scaled decay rate (µ):
𝒙n = 𝜇𝒔n + (1−𝜇)𝒙n-1
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where x and s are coordinates in the three-dimensional MDS perceptual space, and µ is
between zero and unity. The sequential application of this equation to a particular
ordering of stimuli with known perceptual similarity yields a covariate that predicts the
continual modulation of neural response to the presentation of the stimuli, dependent
upon the scaled decay rate (µ) selected. When the µ is set to zero (Figure 4.1C, lower left
panel), the resulting covariate is precisely a global norm model, in which the response to
each stimulus is modeled as proportional to the distance of the stimulus from the center
of the MDS perceptual stimulus space; there is no predicted effect of sequential stimulus
transitions upon neural response. When µ is set to one (Figure 4.1C, lower right panel),
the covariate produced is a 1-back adaptation model, in which the predicted response is
proportional to the distance of the prior stimulus to the current one in the MDSreconstructed stimulus space; the system has no memory of stimuli past the last stimulus
presented. Intermediate values of µ correspond to varying degrees of temporal integration
across the sequence of stimuli.
We modeled the data from the region of interest for each subject using a set of models,
each of which incorporated a drifting norm covariate with a scaled decay rate (µ) ranging
from 0 to 1 in steps of 0.05. Each covariate was mean centered and scaled to have unit
variance. Additional covariates (common to all models) fit the main effect of the stimulus
presentation versus the blank trials and the effect of stimuli presented following a blank
trial. All neural model covariates were convolved with a canonical hemodynamic
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response function (Aguirre et al., 1998). Additional regressors were included to account
for global signal, between-scan variation, and subject-specific spikes.
4.3.8 Whole Brain Mapping
For each value of µ, we combined subjects individual surface maps in FreeSurfer through
a group analysis, resulting in 21 group surface maps. We then combined these into a
single surface map containing at each vertex the µ with the largest beta from the 21
possible. From this surface map, we cropped all vertices where the largest corresponding
beta or the main effect of faces were negative. We also removed any vertices where the
p-value associated with the largest beta was less than 0.5 (Figure 4.2A). To quantify the
anterior-posterior trend present on the whole brain map, 15 circular ROIs with a 15vertex radius were plotted on the fsaverage surface in a continuous line, running
anteriorly along the ventral temporal lobe from the temporal pole (Figure 4.2A, top panel
overlay). On the group maps of Figure 4.2A, the average µ value within each of the 15
ROIs was evaluated for each of the 21 drifting norm models, in order to reveal the trend
from posterior to anterior visual areas (Figure 4.2B). The standard error of the mean at
each anatomical position was estimated by resampling (bootstrapping). The set of
subjects was sampled with replacement up to the total number of available subjects. The
mean value from this resampling was retained and 1000 such means were recorded across
bootstraps. The standard deviation of this set of means provides an estimate of the
standard error of the mean of the measure.
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Figure 4.1: Stimuli, design, and region-of-interest analysis
(a) Faces varied in identity, race, and gender. Each was generated in an “older” or
“younger” version (inset). Separate ratings of pair-wise face similarity were used to
generate the perceptual similarity space. (b) During scanning, subjects observed a
continuous stream of face stimuli and indicated for each if it was the “older” or
“younger” version. Neural responses were modeled using continuous covariates
corresponding to the perceptual distance of the current stimulus from either the previous
face or the center of the stimulus space. (c) Average across-subject regression coefficients
(n=15) within the ROI for norm-based and adaptation effects within an across-subject,
face-responsive region of interest (ROI) in the right fusiform gyrus (inset). Stimulus
space figures below illustrate how neural response to each face is modeled with respect to
the center of the perceptual space or to the prior stimulus for five example stimulus
transitions. (d) Fit to the neural data within the ROI for a range of decay rates (µ). The
stimulus space figures illustrate how the drifting norm (solid vectors) is increasingly
responsive to the most recently presented stimulus at ever higher decay rates.
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4.4 Results
We obtained BOLD fMRI data while subjects viewed a continuous stream of face stimuli
(Figure 4.1B). Separately, the perceptual similarity of the set of 27 faces was measured
for each subject. These perceptual judgments were found to be very similar across
subjects, and thus combined to produce an average perceptual similarity space (Figure
4.1A).
We identified across subjects a face-responsive region of the right fusiform gyrus (Figure
4.1C inset). We focus on the right hemisphere in this study given evidence that sensitivity
to face variation is substantially stronger in the right as compared to the left hemisphere
(Mur et al., 2012). This region has a consistently large, main effect of neural response
across all the faces presented during the experiment. We then sought to replicate prior
findings of “norm-based” and “adaptation” effects in the neural responses to faces within
this region.
4.4.1 Norm-Based and Adaptation Effects
Prior studies of neural responses to faces have found that more distinctive faces evoke a
larger neural response (Loffler et al., 2005; Panis et al., 2011; Davidenko et al., 2011).
We tested for such an effect in our data using a covariate in which the response to a face
is modeled as being proportional to the distance of that face from the center of the
perceptual stimulus space (Figure 4.1B, red curve; also Figure 4.1C, lower left panel).
When modeled in this way, we find a significant norm-based response across subjects
(Figure 4.1C, left bar).

!72

Separate studies have observed that the response to a stimulus may be modulated by the
similarity of the immediately preceding stimulus (Drucker & Aguirre, 2009, Jiang et al.,
2006). We tested for such an effect in our data using a covariate which models the neural
response to a stimulus as proportional to the distance between the current face and the
immediately preceding face (Figure 4.1B, blue curve; also Figure 4.1C, lower right
panel). When modeled in this fashion, we find a significant proportional adaptation
response across subjects (Figure 4.1C, right bar).
An initial interpretation of these results is that adaptation and norm-based effects coexist
in the responses of neural populations. While we have argued elsewhere that these effects
may be mistaken for one another in measurement (Kahn & Aguirre, 2012), we consider
here a deeper connection: that the observed norm-based and adaptation effects are simply
different measurements of a single temporal integration mechanism operating over recent
stimulus history.
4.4.2 A Single Temporal Integration Mechanism
We next tested the hypothesis that stimulus history is temporally integrated into a single
reference point in the stimulus space, which we term the “drifting norm”. The
presentation of a new stimulus draws the drifting norm towards the new stimulus. The
degree to which the current stimulus changes the drifting norm can be described by a
scaled decay rate (µ). At the boundaries, a fully “elastic” neural system updates the
drifting norm to match the last presented stimulus (µ=1), behaving exactly like a 1-back
neural adaptation effect (Drucker & Aguirre, 2009, Jiang et al., 2006), while a “rigid”
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neural system retains the norm at its initial position regardless of presented stimuli (µ=0),
behaving like a norm-based effect (Loffler et al., 2005; Davidenko et al., 2011). This
model is isometric with an exponential integrator over stimulus history with varying
decay rates, here simplified to scaled values of µ between 0 and 1.
We tested this idea by estimating the best fitting parameter of temporal integration (µ) for
each subject within the fusiform region of interest. A set of models, with scaled decay
rates ranging between 0.0 (rigid norm) and 1.0 (fully elastic 1-back adaptation) were
assessed. For each coefficient, we determined how much variance in the neural data was
explained by the model, and obtained the average and variability of this measure across
subjects.
The amount of variance explained in the neural data across subjects as a function of µ
within the right fusiform is shown in Figure 4.1D. As the drifting norm is allowed to relax
from rigid to fully elastic, the fit to the neural data steadily improves and then declines,
reaching a peak at an intermediate value of µ (0.40). This finding suggests that faceresponsive neurons maintain an integrated representation over the last several stimuli to
which the currently presented face is compared.
While this result is consistent with a single temporal integration mechanism, it alone
cannot adjudicate between a single integration mechanism over intermediate temporal
history and a neural system that truly incorporates both adaptation and a norm-based
effects. We addressed this question using a cross-validation procedure in which the data
from n-1 subjects were used to estimate the scaled decay rate and the individual
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contributions of norm-based and adaptation effects. For the nth subject, we then
compared the variance explained by a model combining the norm-based and adaptation
covariates with the estimated weights, with the variance explained by the drift covariate.
In all 15 subjects, the proportion of variance explained by the single mechanism model
was greater than the variance explained by the combined model (R2 single mechanism
model = 0.0070±0.0016, R2 combined model = 0.0042±0.0011, both mean ± SEM).
4.4.3 Drifting Norms Across the Visual Pathway
The analyses to this point confirms the validity of the drifting norm model within the
right fusiform gyrus, a region known to be responsive to face stimuli and where findings
of norm-based coding are usually described. Visual stimuli, however, evoke broad neural
responses across ventral visual cortices. While particular category-selective visual areas
have peak responses to preferred stimuli, the identity and relative similarity of visual
objects may be decoded from the broader responses (Kriegeskorte et al., 2008). We
therefore examined how neural response modulation based on temporal context varied
across ventral visual cortex. Broadly, we anticipated that earlier visual areas would show
greater modulation on the short time-scale and ever more anterior visual areas would
integrate over longer time-scales (Hasson et al., 2008).
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Figure 4.2: A gradient of temporal integration
(a) Optimal scaled decay rate (µ) across subjects at each ventral occipito-temporal
cortical site for dataset 1. White points indicate the centers of the ROIs sampled in panel
b. The stimulus space for this dataset is inset. (b) Plot of across-subject average, regional
µ from the posterior to anterior ventral occipito-temporal cortex, fit with a second-order
polynomial. Averages taken from cortical regions of the size and positions indicated in
panel A. (c) Optimal µ across subjects as measured in a separate dataset. The stimulus
space for this dataset is inset. (d) Plot of across-subject, average, regional µ for the
second dataset.
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We measured the µ that corresponded to the best-fitting drifting norm model separately
for every vertex across the right cortical surface. We examined only those vertices that
showed a positive main effect of face presentation compared to a blank screen across
subjects and a positive effect of stimulus dissimilarity. We found that near the occipital
pole, in the vicinity of the calcarine sulcus, the measured µ was 1.0, indicating that the
neural response within this earliest visual area is modulated only by the immediately
preceding stimulus. Moving anteriorly along the ventral cortex, the measured µ declines,
indicating an ever greater degree of integration of stimulus history (Figure 4.2A).
We quantified this gradient by defining a path running from the occipital pole anteriorly
along the ventral surface of the occipito-temporal cortex. Figure 4.2B plots the average
peak µ within patches of cortex centered at each of 15 points along this path, revealing
the increasing integration of temporal context in ever more anterior visual areas. A second
degree polynomial fit confirmed the ever longer degree of integration of stimulus history,
between early visual areas and higher level areas.
Figure 4.2 demonstrates a posterior-to-anterior gradient of temporal effects along the
ventral visual stream, in which increasingly long integrated windows of stimulus history
modulate the response to a presented stimuli. The gradient (Figure 4.2A) is described by
the peak decay rate (µ) which best explains the neural signal measured at each patch of
cortex. This map dispenses with the relative strength of these effects, however, and
additional perspectives are necessary.
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Figure 4.3: Strength of measured temporal integration models on the cortical surface
(a) The p-values associated with each measured decay rate model at all vertices
measured. (b) The ratio of the variance of the measured decay rate model and the
variance of the main effect model at each vertex. These are cropped to vertices with
values greater than 0.01 and fully saturated for values above 0.25. Values >> 1 are
cropped. Since the covariates for the main effect and all temporal modulatory models are
scaled to one, this is equivalent to a ratio of the beta values for each.

A surface map of the p-values (Figure 4.3A) for the peak drift model (Figure 4.3A, inset)
illustrates the significance of the effects at each vertex. It appears the medial edges near
the fusiform portion of the gradient show stronger effects. Complementarily informative
is a plot of the ratio of the variance of the modeled peak temporal effect against the
variance of the modeled main effect (Figure 4.3B). For regions where the main effect of
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facial stimuli is large, this ratio will be relatively reduced (red). This is true overlapping
the FFA region of interest, selected specifically for having large main effects of stimuli.
For regions where both the p-value of the peak temporal model is relatively low, and the
temporal modulation covariate is larger relative to the main effect of stimuli, it is
increasingly possible that the temporal modulatory effect model is capturing noise. For
more anterior regions, this seems to be the case.
4.5 Discussion
In this study, we investigated modulatory mechanisms of the neural response to facial
stimuli - specifically the relationship between norm-based representation and short-term
neural adaptation. We proposed a single mechanism based upon temporal integration to
unite these two effects, where the neural response to a stimulus is modulated as a function
of distance to a “drifting” norm. In turn, the norm’s position is updated by the recent
visual experience at a rate determined by a scaled decay rate (µ), which can be directly
related to an underlying exponential temporal integration function.
For µ close to zero, the drifting norm model behaves like a short-term neural adaptation
effect, modulating neural responses as a function of the shortest-term stimulus history.
For µ close to one, the drifting norm model behaves like a norm-based effect. A neural
population that has an intermediate timescale of temporal integration, when probed for
either adaptation or global norm effects in a neuroscience experiment, will be found to
have both, resulting from the correlation of both adaptation and global norm predictors
with the true single effect. We confirmed that an intermediate drifting norm model can
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better describe the data than either the norm-based or 1-back adaptation model, and used
a model comparison and cross-validation approach to prove that the drifting norm model
outperforms a combination of both earlier models. Lastly, we extend our findings beyond
our initial region of interest to investigate the broader topology of temporal contextual
encoding. We observe a gradient of increasing temporal integration from primary visual
cortex extending anteriorly along the ventral surface of the right temporal lobe. This
result suggests a hierarchy of temporal integration at ever higher levels of extrastriate
cortex.
Merely at a conceptual stage, dynamic encoding based on recent temporal context solves
a major problem of putative norm-based representation models: how is the brain
supposed to “know” the arbitrary center of an unseen set? Within a unified framework of
a drifting norm, any non-zero µ will position the drifting norm near the center of the
space within a reasonable number of stimulus exposures, regardless of the initial set-point
of the neural system.
Neural adaptation is an ubiquitous phenomenon in sensory systems, occurring at many if not all - levels of the sensory hierarchy, and is thought to be mediated by various
mechanisms beyond merely the short-term adaptation effects here described. Similarly,
the realm of norm-based coding models - many of which postulate a special status for a
“global” norm - reaches beyond the narrow form of dynamic norm-based effects
(Davidenko et al., 2011, Panis et al., 2011) approached in this study. The literature on all
these phenomena is extensive, yet still evolving. Our results cannot settle many questions
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- for instance that of global norm-based encoding - yet these findings offer a novel
inclusive perspective on these effects as well as exciting avenues for future investigation.
For example, as we have previously recognized, short-term neural adaptation and normbased coding effects as previously studied can be confounded in measurement (Kahn &
Aguirre, 2012). Our work here resolves this confound, suggesting both may be
manifestations of a single modulatory effect. With respect to postulated differential
responses to global norms, with careful experimental design, these could be tested while
controlling for the modulatory effect of recent stimulus context. Further, it could be that
the modulatory effect here demonstrated might represent a mechanism by which the
representational geometry of visual cortex is lastingly modified by visual experience.
This possibility could be tested by carefully steering the path of the drifting norm to
repeatedly cross different non-central locations in a perceptual space for different subjects
- while maintaining mean stimulus exposure - and then probing the distributed response
after hours or days. Lastly, it may be that multiple drifting norms could be maintained by
the visual system, coding for different stimulus features or categories, with distinct
windows of temporal integration distributed across the visual hierarchy.
Neural encoding based on temporal context is conceptually linked to the work of Hasson
et al. (2008). In an elegant study using short video stimuli presented intact, in reverse, or
temporally scrambled, the researchers demonstrate a hierarchy of “temporal receptive
windows” across the cortex, with ever more anterior regions sensitive to ever longer
snippets of video content. Our finding of a monotonic posterior-anterior gradient of
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temporal integration is consistent with this result. Hasson et al. (2008) show consistent
differences between regions in the duration of temporal integration, suggesting different
portions of cortex may have inherent temporal windows over which visual information is
encoded.
The finding of differential modulatory effects of stimulus history for increasingly anterior
portions of the right temporal lobe is interesting. Previously, the large majority of studies
showing fMRI adaptation effect for faces have focused on the fusiform face area or
immediately adjacent (e.g. Andrews & Ewbank, 2004; James & Gauthier, 2006; Fang et
al. 2007; Harris & Aguirre, 2010). There exist studies demonstrating differential fMRI
adaptation effects (with a temporal component) in anterior regions, though for non-face
stimuli (Epstein et al. 2008). The closest analog in the face literature to a different
posterior to anterior adaptive difference is demonstrated by Weiner et al. (2010), though
the regional difference demonstrated was between posterior- and middle-fusiform (pFus
and mFus, respectively).
This relative lack of precedent could draw into question the reliability of our
measurements for increasingly anterior regions. Face identity information has been
observed to be resolvable using distributed pattern analysis in the right anterior temporal
lobe (Kriegeskorte et al, 2007), even in cases when a fusiform ROI is unable to
distinguish them. Taking into account the possibility that distributed patterns & neural
adaptation index different features of neural information (Drucker & Aguirre, 2009;
Epstein & Morgan, 2011), it could be the case that the coarseness of identify information

!82

increases from posterior-to-anterior, in accordance with Kriegeskorte et al. (2007). If this
were the case, we might expect that the apparent underperformance of our modulatory
models (Figure 4.3) anterior to the FFA resulted from the relative weakness of individual
vertex modeling on a “coarser” neural coding region. Two aspects of our data support this
interpretation. First, the series of ROI analyses (Figure 4.2B) demonstrate a smooth
gradient of temporal integration. These ROIs will aggregate over small effects to give a
stable estimate of regional behavior. Phrased differently: though the reliability of
individual vertex results may decline for increasingly anterior regions, the central
tendency within region of interest should be stable. Second: we observe a difference in
the anterior pattern of the temporal gradient between datasets. Given that the second
dataset was generated using a more tightly clustered stimulus set, we might expect that it
would be less susceptible to the effects of coarseness in increasingly anterior regions.
Both of these observations are post-hoc; future work is necessary to understand the
relationship of our measures to the underlying neural code. Regardless, the possibility
that both temporal history effects and relative neural code coarseness vary along similar
trajectories could be deeply informative.
These findings could account for the variable effect of stimulus history in neuroscience
and behavioral experiments. A single modulatory mechanism based on temporal
integration offers a tidy explanation for the different findings, in strikingly similar
studies, of either norm-based or adaptation effects (Panis et al., 2011; Kahn & Aguirre,
2012). Different paradigms, response conditions, and subject instructions arguably probe
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the cortical gradient of temporal integration at different levels, producing behavioral
effects ranging from short-term perceptual adaptation to the dynamic formation of
prototype representations.
Our study is also not suitable for answering the latent question of whether the
determining factor in temporal integration of stimulus history is time or number of trials.
Indeed, our findings from with a region-of-interest show that our measured modulatory
effect has a half-life of either 3-4 stimuli or 4-5 seconds. In single-unit studies in early
sensory systems (e.g., the fly H1 visual neuron or mouse retinal ganglion cell; Fairhall et
al., 2001; Wark et al., 2009), the timescale of integration was found to vary with the
timescale of stimulus changes. This suggests that neural systems can scale temporal
integration to the context of stimulus variability. Interestingly, a cascade of decaying
exponential integrators has this property (Wark et al. , 2007), which could correspond to
the gradient of temporal integration we observe along the ventral temporal cortex.
In neural and behavioral terms, the implications of a moving norm are open to
interpretation. One on hand, a moving norm can be thought of as implementing gain
control, preventing large transitions in the perceptual space from saturating neural
responses by constantly readjusting its reference point. Alternatively, the norm in our
model can be understood as a ”prediction” of the upcoming stimulus given previous
sensory evidence, with the evoked signal corresponding to an error signal. This
possibility is in agreement with the predictive coding hypothesis (Friston & Kiebel,
2009), and could be tested empirically via novel experimental design. Regardless of the
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underlying theory, we believe that our model is a useful and didactic description of the
cumulative effects of neural response modulation.
Major advances have been made in recent years toward the goal of mapping the
representational geometry of visual cortex. Distributed neural population responses, as
measured by BOLD fMRI, have been shown to contain information regarding the largescale perceptual similarity relationships of broad categories of visual stimuli
(Kriegeskorte et al. 2008), and recently it was suggested that this representational
geometry is relatively uniform and ubiquitous across ventral visual cortex (Cohen &
Alvarez, 2014). Our results presented here, focusing on the nuanced dynamics of
distributed representation, speak to the questions of why visual information should be so
broadly distributed across the ventral stream, and how processing unfolds over a
seemingly uniform scaffold.
A representational neural state is a product of both the underlying geometry and
modulatory effects, such as those of temporal context demonstrated here and likely
others, such as task demands. Moving forward, it may be productive to consider visual
neural encoding in terms of a manifold, a dimensioned encoding structure with temporal
and task-based response characteristics. In this framework, the currently studied
representational geometry of visual cortex (Kriegeskorte et al., 2008)) would be a
primary map projection of the manifold, and higher dimensions could scaffold the
dynamic properties of perception. The interactions of stimulus properties, task demands,
or cortical areas with the representational geometry could be collected as parallel charts
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of the manifold through careful experimental manipulations. Investigations such as these
would allow for a more nuanced understanding of what information is encoded in a given
neural state, and thus facilitate the future pursuit of neural decoding.
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5 An ERP Index of Visual “Sameness” is Altered in Autism Spectrum
Disorder
5.1 Abstract
In the search for a neural etiology of autism spectrum disorder, Leo Kanner’s original
observation (1943) of an “insistence on sameness” in the autistic phenotype provides a
promising avenue of inquiry, prompting? the question: “how does the brain evaluate
sameness?” This question is far from trivial, though one answer lies in how neural
systems relate current sensory information to recent stimulus history. Advances in
neuroimaging have lent perspective on this evaluation, suggesting that neural responses
to visual stimuli are modulated by similarity to a prior that reflects temporally integrated
stimulus history.
In this study, we ask whether this modulatory effect is altered in individuals with autism
spectrum disorder. As the timescale of temporal integration can be related to the momentto-moment changes in the visual environment as well as the generalization of stimulus
relationships (i.e., across a longer timescale), we hypothesized that autism would be
marked by response modulations based on increasingly immediate stimulus history.
Using electroencephalography, we measured event-related potentials to morphed face
stimuli in 54 young adults (27 with ASD). By modeling the timescale of the evoked
response modulations, we find that ASD is marked by effects of information accumulated
over shorter temporal windows. We relate this difference in neural processing to recent
theories of perceptual functioning in ASD.
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5.2 Introduction
A broad collection of neurocognitive theories of ASD have implicated perceptual
processing as a locus of dysfunction. Early and enduring theories, such as the weak
central coherence account (Frith 1989, Happé & Frith, 2006), the enhanced
discrimination and reduced generalization hypothesis (Plaisted, 2001), and the enhanced
perceptual functioning account (Mottron et al., 2006), highlight perceptual features of
ASD as driving imbalances in cognitive functions and abilities. These proposed
differences commonly take the form of a bias toward local processing at the expense of
global understanding, difficulties with abstracting or generalizing commonalities (the
cognitive style of ‘missing the forest for the trees’), and a more veridical perspective on
the world. Though the predictions of these theories have been met with mixed success
experimentally, they have succeeded in keeping the realm of perception central to
discussions of autistic etiology.
As theoretic accounts of ASD have evolved, the discussion of perception has become
grounded in theories of sensory systems - including the process of neural representation.
Neural representation is the means by which sensory information is encoded in patterns
of neural activity, and the nature of a neural representation determines the information
available to a neural system for guiding learning and behavior. Though the idea that
differences in neural representation could drive ASD symptomology is not new
(Gustafsson, 1997; McClelland, 2000), recent theoretical accounts of ASD have reemphasized the potential explanatory importance of sensory encoding / decoding
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disruptions in ASD. These recent neurocognitive accounts approach the sensory process
holistically, considering it, for instance, in terms of a Bayesian inference calculator
(Pellicano & Burr, 2012), or a predictive coding system (Lawson et al., 2013; Van de
Cruys et al., 2014).
While theoretic approaches possess intellectual heft, they require neural correlates to
establish an experimental foothold in the brain. The work presented here begins with a
model of neural response modulations that are related to stimulus representation. By
beginning with a neural model, we remain agnostic to the broader theoretic frameworks,
but benefit from the proximity of our model to the brain.
The central measure of this study is an extension a long-studied feature of sensory
systems: neural adaptation - an attenuation of neural response to repetitions of similar or
identical stimuli (Grill-Spector & Malach, 2001). Recently, it was demonstrated that
neural adaptation effects extend in time - that is, the modulatory effect on evoked
responses depends upon stimulus history beyond merely the most recent stimulus seen
(Mattar et al., in preparation). For continuous, serial presentations of stimuli, sensory
history is best modeled as being temporally integrated into a drifting norm. The drifting
norm is in essence a continually updated “prior” used as a reference for neural response
modulation.
The character of the drifting norm depends upon the window of temporal integration. For
long temporal integration windows, the drifting norm behaves like a prototype - residing
near the center of a representational stimulus space. For increasingly short temporal
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windows, the drifting norm reflects moment-to-moment stimulus history. At the shortest
extreme of the model, the drifting norm is updated by each new stimulus, with the
resulting modulation behaving effectively like a 1-back neural adaptive effect. Using
fMRI, Mattar et al. (in preparation) demonstrate BOLD signal modulations in the
fusiform gyrus of neurotypical participants are best fit by an intermediate window of
temporal integration.
We use the same framework (Mattar et al., in preparation) in this study to model
modulations to the evoked responses to faces in electroencephalography (EEG). The
temporal character of the “drifting norm” is captured in a single parameter - the scaled
decay rate (µ). Moment-to-moment updating of the drifting norm (akin to 1-back
adaptation effects) is based on a maximal decay rate (µ = 1) while generalization of
central tendency (akin to a prototype-referenced modulation) corresponds to a null decay
rate (µ = 0).
Our prediction for ASD in this case is straightforward; we anticipated a shift toward
modulation of neural responses based on more recent stimulus history. The reasons for
this are several-fold. For one, the temporal integration model is related to the
establishment of a prototype - a representation of the central tendency of a stimulus
space. From a certain perspective, this is the essence of weak central coherence (Frith,
1989; Happé & Frith, 2006) or the reduced generalization hypothesis - the ability to
abstract a sense of central tendency. Behavioral studies of ASD support our expectation.
A reduced ability to form perceptual prototypes has been suggested in ASD (Klinger &
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Dawson, 2001), and face adaptive after-effects have been shown to be reduced in ASD
(Pellicano et al., 2007). Given that these effects both build up over time and rely on a
sense of central tendency (Rhodes & Jeffery, 2006), a shift toward neural modulation
based on a more recent window of stimulus history could be mechanistic to these
behavioral observations in ASD.
We measured event related potentials (ERPs) while participants viewed a continuous
stream of morphed faces while performing an orthogonal oddball task. We examined first
the modulations of the P200 component of the evoked response, given that it is known to
be sensitive to effects of recent stimulus history (Kahn et al., 2010). Modeling the
extremes of the drifting norm framework (µ = 0 and µ = 1) demonstrates a group
difference in this component, which we build upon by examining the full range of decay
rates. We then investigate modulatory effects across the duration of the measured evoked
response in a component-independent manner. The group difference we demonstrate
suggests that the shift toward moment-to-moment modulations we observe in ASD has
unexpected cascading effects on the time course of face processing. We go on to discuss
the implications of increasingly moment-to-moment modulation of neural responses in
ASD on recent neurocognitive models of the disorder.
5.3 Methods
5.3.1 Participants
Fifty-four young adult subjects (27 with ASD, 27 neurotypical - NT) were included in
this study.
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Participants were recruited from the Philadelphia area and surrounding region. All
participants were compensated for their time, travel costs, and a bonus (up to $10) for
task attention. All subjects earned the entire bonus. Informed consent was obtained from
all participants after a complete description of procedures, and the study design was
reviewed and approved by the Institutional Review Board (IRB) of the Children’s
Hospital of Philadelphia.
The two groups were matched on FSIQ, handedness, and gender ratio. The groups
differed significantly by age (a mean difference of 1.43 years that was not deemed
clinically relevant). See Table 1 for a subject information.
Volunteers and parents of volunteers were screened over the phone to rule out the
presence of Axis I disorders, uncorrected auditory or visual impairments, or significant
medical or neurological abnormalities or injuries. Participants with ASD had their
diagnosis confirmed by current symptom presentation (Autism Diagnostic Observation
Schedule[ADOS], Module 4; Lord et al., 2009) and autism-specific developmental
history (Autism Diagnostic Interview [ADI-R]; Lord et al., 1994). Clinical assessments
were administered, scored, and interpreted by clinical psychologists or doctoral level
trainees under supervision of clinical psychologists. Full Scale IQ above 75, determined
by Weschler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence (WASI-II; Wechsler, 2008), was used as an
inclusionary criterion.
An additional 6 participants provided EEG data but were excluded from analysis. Two
subjects were excluded prior to pre-processing: one subject (ASD) was excluded based
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on clinician uncertainty over diagnosis, and a second subject (neurotypical) was excluded
due to a setup error during data collection. Four subjects (two with ASD, two
neurotypical) were excluded based on excessive artifacts during pre-processing
(exceeding 40% of modeled trials).
Table 5.1: Participant characterization
ASD (N = 27)

TDC (N = 27)

Mean(SD)

Mean (SD)

Significance

Age in years

19.64(1.61)

21.07(2.38)

t(52)=2.59,
p=0.012

FSIQ

109.96(17.44)

113.19(11.29)

t(52)=-0.81,
p=0.42

Gender

22 male, 5 female

21 male, 5 female

Fisher’s exact test
p = 1.0

Handedness

25 right, 2 left

25 right, 2 left

Fisher’s exact test
p = 1.0

5.3.2 Stimuli
Two female faces with neutral expressions (identities 06F and 10F) from the NimStim
stimulus set (Tottenham et al., 2009) were used to create a linear morph continuum. The
raw faces were aligned and resized to match inter-pupillary distance and location in
Adobe Photoshop CS5 (Adobe, San Jose, CA). The images were desaturated, major
blemishes were removed, and the faces were cropped of external features with a 3-pixel
feathered oval boundary. Using MATLAB (MathWorks, Natick, MA), the mean
luminance of the faces was equilibrated. Wireframe templates were fitted to the images
using JPsychomorph (http://cherry.dcs.aber.ac.uk:8080/wiki/jpsychomorph) and the faces
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were morphed in 11 equal steps. After morphing, the images were balanced for mean
luminance once again. Six faces (Figure 4.1A) from the 11 original steps were used in the
experiment (steps 2, 3, 5, 7, 9, 10). In addition, four male faces to be used as targets were
drawn from the NimStim set (23M 27M 28M 35M) were prepared in the same manner,
but were not morphed. The stimuli from the NimStim set are not authorized for
publication, all figures use representative identities created using the same methods.
5.3.3 ERP Stimulus Presentation
The experiment consisted of a total of 1082 trials. Stimulus order was set using a series of
3 first-order counterbalanced (k = 18, n = 2) de Bruijn cycles (Aguirre et al., 2012). The
18-element sequence allowed for counterbalancing of the 6 morphed stimuli and 3 ISI
durations. Nine break periods occurred evenly through the experiment, during which the
experiment paused until the participant clicked to continue. Ten “target” trials occurred at
pseudorandom points during the experiment. After each target and break, the five
preceding trials were repeated to “warm-up” the carry-over effects of interest. For the
beginning of the experiment, the five final trials were presented as warm up. Three
separate versions of the full sequence were generated and counterbalanced across
participants to reduce the potential for higher-order stimulus order effects. All target and
warm-up trials were excluded from the analysis, leaving only the 972 trials from the three
cycles used in the main analyses.
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Figure 5.1: Experimental design &
modeling
(a) Stimuli were six exemplars
(unequally spaced) drawn from a
linear morph continuum of two
identities. The actual anchor
identities were taken from the
NimStim stimulus set (Tottenham
et al., 2009); example stimuli
shown are two of the author’s
friends. (a) Experimental design
and modeling. Morphed stimuli
were presented continuously while
subjects monitored for the rare
appearance of “robbers” and
responded with a button press
(example “robber” is
representative). Trials were
modeled as the perceptual distance
from a reference point which varied
as a function of the scaled decay
rate (µ). (c) Grand average evoked
response across the sensors-ofinterest (SOIs). Four bilateral SOIs
(inset) were selected using an
independent localizer. The average
waveforms across subjects shows
four canonical components within
the 600 ms epoch. The P200
window indicated was used for
component-of-interest analysis.

Each trial (Figure 5.1B) consisted of a stimulus presentation subtending 5.7˚ x 8.6˚ of
visual angle on a gray background for 1000 ms, followed by an inter-stimulus interval of
200, 300, or 400 ms during which a black fixation cross was shown (Figure 5.1B).
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Stimuli were presented on a 19” ViewSonic G90fb CRT display using EPrime 2
(Psychology Software Tools, Inc.) situated at eye level 100 cm from participants.
During the experiments, participants performed an orthogonal task (“catch the robbers”)
in which they responded via button press to the appearance of any of four male faces (the
“robbers”) among the female distractors. Participants were trained on a version of the
task using different distractor faces immediately prior to the main experiment in order to
familiarize themselves with the target faces. Participants were generally amused by the
task. Participants responded to targets via mouse click and responses were collected in
EPrime 2. For successful identification of targets, a green set of “bars” would appear over
the face (Figure 5.1B), indicating a correct response. For “false alarm” responses, a red
frame would appear around the face to indicate the incorrect response.
Following the main experiment, participants completed a short passive-viewing
functional localizer consisting of faces, cityscapes, and objects (72 exemplars each,
subtending 12.5˚ x 12.5˚ of visual angle) in a random order. In the localizer, stimuli were
presented for 400 ms with a jittered ITI between 800 and 1200 ms. The localizer was
used in order to independently assess “sensors of interest” for use in the main analysis
(Liu, Harris, & Kanwisher, 2002).
5.3.4 ERP Data Collection
Data were collected using the BioSemi ActiveTwo system (http://www.biosemi.com/
products.htm) with 64 active electrodes with sintered Ag-AgCl tips fitted into sized head
caps. Additionally, two electrodes with a flat 4-mm pallet were placed on the mastoid
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processes bilaterally with adhesive stickers and used as references for data import.
Electrical offsets were verified prior to initiation of data collection & kept below 25 µV
for all channels. Continuous data were sampled at a 512 Hz sample rate using the default
1/5 sample rate low-pass filtering (http://www.biosemi.com/faq/adjust_samplerate.htm).
Participants were seated alone in an adjacent room from the experimenter with the door
between ajar. Verbal encouragement was kept uniform and offered during breaks (e.g.
“doing great, keep it up.”) in order to assess subject attentiveness.
5.3.5 ERP Pre-Processing
All EEG data were pre-processed offline using MATLAB and and the EEGLAB toolbox
version 9 (Delorme & Makeig, 2004). Data were imported into EEGLAB directly,
mastoid channels were indicated as references and excluded. The data were re-referenced
to the average signal across the 64 cranial channels, and a 40 Hz low-pass filter was
applied. The continuous data were separated into 700 msec epochs (100 ms pre-stimulus
onset and 600 post) corresponding to individual stimulus presentations. Epochs were
baseline corrected (100 ms pre-stimulus onset). Sensors-of-interest were identified using
the independent localizer data via a point-to-point t-test comparing the face and house
conditions in the latency range of the N170 and N250. Sensors-of-interest (Figure 5.1C,
inset) were selected if they were identified as significant in a majority of subjects.
Artifacts were identified only within the sensors-of-interest using a ±50 µV threshold
across the full epoch. Trials containing artifacts within the SOIs were removed from
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analysis. Groups did not significantly differ on frequency of artifacts (ASD: mean
10.28%, std 9.48%; NT: mean 7.32%, std 9.65% ).
For the initial analyses (Figure 5.2), the P200 component of the evoked response was
defined across participants. A grand average waveform was generated for all included
trials and participants (Figure 5.1C). The P200 was defined as the peak value within a
search window of 200 to 300 ms post-stimulus onset. The P200 amplitude for individual
trials was evaluated as the mean of the 5 data-point (9.76 ms) window about this time
point (Figure 5.1C, grey column).
For the analysis investigating the entire evoked response epochs (Figure 5.3), each time
point of the evoked response across epochs was modeled individually. Grand average
waveforms were generated for each group by averaging all modeled epochs within
subject and then across subject (Figure 5.3A). At each time point, the peak µ model was
determined within group. The plot of the percent variance explained for the peak model
(Figure 5.3B) is used a clipping mask for a color plot demonstrating the peak µ. For
Figure 5.3C, the waveforms were exported from MATLAB as EPS files and were
manipulated in Adobe Illustrator CS5 for visualization. The raw paths were set to 12 pt
line widths and outlined automatically by Adobe Illustrator. The resulting outline was
used as a clipping mask for a columnar color plot indicating the peak µ for each time
point within group after statistical correction.
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5.3.6 General Linear Modeling
All analyses relied upon modified general linear models (GLMs). For every GLM here
reported, the data modeled corresponded to a single narrow time window of the evoked
responses across trials. The GLM would contain a covariate modeling the effect of
interest, the effect of inter-stimulus interval as a nuisance covariate, and a unit offset
term. Following calculation of the ß values on each covariate, the percentage of the
residual variance explained by the covariate of interest would be calculated as follows.
The variance of the modeled effect of interest (the variance of the covariate of the effect
of interest multiplied by its ß value) would be divided by variance of the original data
after ISI effects were removed. This denominator was calculated as the variance of the
difference between the original data and the modeled effect of ISI (the covariate for ISI
multiplied by the beta). This proportion is multiplied and reported as percent residual
variance explained. All covariates of interest (described below) were mean-centered and
scaled to have unit variance. Lastly, as a convention, the sign of the covariates was
reversed to correspond to direction of modulation (Kahn et al., 2010).
For the modeling of adaptation-like (“from previous”) effects a covariate was created
modeling the dissimilarity of the prior face to the current one on each trial (Figure 5.1B,
blue line). These were set to have value for each trial corresponding to a linear distance
within the linear stimulus space (with the six morph faces positioned at 1, 2, 4, 6, 8, and
9).The resulting covariate was mean-centered and scaled to have unit-variance. This
covariate was identical to the drifting norm covariate with µ = 1.
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For the modeling of norm-like “from center” effects (Figure 5.1B, yellow line), a
covariate was created modeling the distance of each stimulus within the linear stimulus
space from the center of the space (e.g. the difference between any given face position
and the average of the face positions). The resulting covariate was mean-centered and
scaled to have unit-variance. This covariate was identical to the drifting norm covariate
with µ = 0.
Following from Mattar et al. (in preparation), we recognized that adaptation and normbased effects represent narrow windows onto a single effect model of modulation based
upon temporal context. The “drifting-norm” is expressed as the reference point from
which the perceptual distance of the currently presented stimulus is measured. The
drifting norm position is updated on each trial as a function of the scaled decay rate (µ,
between 0 and unity) using the function: Xn = Xn-1 + µ(Sn - Xn-1), where Sn is the
location of the most recent stimulus and Xn the location of the drifting norm on a given
trial, both as positions within the linear morph space.
For each “drifting norm” covariate, the value on any given trials was set to the distance
between the given stimulus and the drifting norm on that trial. 51 covariates were
generated corresponding to values of µ between 0 and 1 in steps of 0.02. Each covariate
was mean-centered and set to have unit variance.
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5.3.7 Peak-µ Waveform Correction
For the analysis investigating the entire epoch of the evoked response, it was necessary to
correct for both the number of comparisons within group & also evaluate whether group
differences were significant. This was handled with a two-fold test of significance.
Within each group, the full array of % residual variance explained values [time points x
µ] was tested for significance. The results were FDR correct at α < 0.05 for each group.
Separately, group differences were assessed by subtracting the full array of residual %
variance explained values [time points x µ] for neurotypical participants from that of the
ASD group. To evaluate these differences for significance, a bootstrap resampling the two
groups with replacement was performed 1000 times and the difference between each
bootstrap at every point in the [time point x µ] array evaluated. The standard deviation of
the bootstrap differences at each point was taken as the SEM of the corresponding point
of the veridical difference map and used to assess significance. The resulting p-values
were FDR corrected at α < 0.05.
For the plots of the full waveforms in each group (Figure 5.3C), the time points rendered
in color demonstrated significant % residual variance explained after FDR correction
within group, as well as a significant corrected group difference in % residual variance
explained for the time point and µ rendered. This double-correction suggests the
modulations rendered represent both significant within-group and across-group effects.
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5.4 Results
In this experiment, we collected EEG data while participants with ASD and neurotypical
controls monitored a continuous series of linearly morphed faces for oddball targets
(“robbers”). We modeled modulations of the evoked response to faces in our data based
upon a “drifting norm” (Mattar et al., in preparation) framework, in which response
amplitude is altered as a function of distance from a reference point reflecting temporally
integrated stimulus history. The variable of interest in this framework is the timescale of
this temporal integration - how freely does the norm drift? At one extreme (a scaled
decay rate µ = 0), stimulus history is broadly integrated & thus the norm remains fixed at
the center of the stimulus space. At the other extreme (µ = 1), the drifting norm is updated
completely to match the most recent face. Since a longer timescale of integration
corresponds to the generalization of a perceptual prototype - a process argued to be
altered in ASD (Klinger & Dawson, 2001) - we hypothesized that our participants with
ASD would demonstrate modulations based upon more recent stimulus history.
We first modeled effects within the P200 component of the evoked response to faces, as
this component has been previously shown to exhibit modulations based upon stimulus
history (Kahn et al., 2010). Based upon these results, we then investigated modulations of
responses in a component-agnostic manner across 600 ms of the evoked response.
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Figure 5.2: Analysis within the
P200 component
(a) The amplitude of the P200
component across trials was
modeled first as a function of
distance from a central
“norm” (yellow bars) or from the
distance of the prior face to the
current one (blue bars) in the linear
stimulus space. A significant
interaction effect of model by
group was observed. Error bars
correspond to the between-subject
SEM. (b) The amplitude of the
P200 component was next
modeled using 51 “drifting norm”
models corresponding to scaled
decay rates (µ) between 0 and 1 in
steps of 0.02. The neurotypical
group (NT) demonstrated a peak µ
of 0.06 (yellow arrow) while the
ASD group had a peak of of 0.74
(blue arrow).
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5.4.1 Analysis Within the P200 Component
The P200 component of the evoked response has been demonstrated to exhibit amplitude
modulations based on recent stimulus history, and so we began by modeling the
amplitude of this component. A grand average waveform (Figure 5.1C) was obtained
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across all participants and groups. The center of the P200 component was identified as
237.89 ms after stimulus onset, and the amplitude of the response was set as a mean of
the five time points around this peak.
Following from the analyses in Mattar et al. (in preparation), we first targeted
modulations from the extremes of the drifting norm framework, which correspond to a
“1-back” neural adaptation effect - modulation as a function of current stimulus distance
from the stimulus immediately preceding in time, and a “norm-based” effect - a
modulation as a function of current stimulus distance from the center of the stimulus
space. These effects were modeled separately in all participants, and summarized as a
percentage of the residual variance explained within the P200 component after effects of
inter-stimulus interval were removed. These data are presented in Figure 5.2A. In the
ASD group, a significant amount of the variance was explained by the model
corresponding 1-back neural adaptation (“from previous”, t(26) = 4.45, p < 1.43e-04) as
well as the model corresponding to a norm-based effect (“from center, t(26) = 2.51, p <
0.019). The neurotypical group showed a significant modulation of the P200 component;
in contrast to the ASD group, modulation in nuerotypical corresponded to a norm based
effect (“from center” t(26) = 4.51, p < 1.22e-04). A repeated-measures ANOVA
comparing the groups and models demonstrated a significant interaction effect of group
by model, suggesting that the boundaries of the drifting norm framework varied across
diagnostic boundaries (F(1,52) = 7.25, p = 0.0095).
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As the boundary conditions of the drifting norm framework appeared altered, we then
investigated the full spectrum of temporal integration windows within the P200. We
evaluated the percentage variance of the P200 amplitude explained by models
corresponding to 51 values of the scaled decay rate (µ) across participants. These are
summarized in Figure 5.2B, averaged across group. The “peak” scaled decay rate is
indicated, as the max of the averaged curves for each group. The optimal scaled decay
rate for neurotypical participants (µ = 0.06) is smaller than that of the ASD group (µ =
0.74) suggesting the P200 component is modulated in neurotypical participants based
upon a longer window of stimulus history relative to participants with ASD. This
difference can be evaluated statistically by finding the peak µ for each subject and testing
the groups using a 2-sample t-test assuming unequal variance. While this betweensubjects average yields a smaller difference, the group separation is significant (t(50.25)
= 2.44, p = 0.018).
5.4.2 Analysis of the Full Evoked Response Time-Course
A suggested finding in ASD is the potential for phase delays in the evoked response to
sensory information (Sutherland, 2010). Were the modulatory effects we are investigating
to vary across time, we might anticipate that comparing groups at a fixed time after
stimulus onset to demonstrate differences based upon the stage of processing and not
upon the underlying window of temporal integration.
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Figure 5.3: Analysis across evoked response
(a) Group average waveforms for neurotypicals (left) and ASD (right). Grey regions
represent the standard error of the mean at each time point. (b) Percentage residual
variance explained, after interstimulus interval effects are accounted for, labeled by the
peak scaled decay rate (µ) at each time point of the 600 ms epoch. (c) Statistical analysis.
Group average waveforms were labeled as in B. Time points rendered in color
represented models whose % residual variance explained was significantly greater than
zero (α < 0.05, FDR corrected), and for which there was a significant difference in %
residual variance explained between groups for the peak µ (α < 0.05, FDR corrected).
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We thus next modeled the modulatory effects of stimulus history across the entire
extracted epoch (600 ms) of the evoked response. Each group waveform is plotted in
Figure 5.3A. Should the modulations unfold evenly over the time course for each group
but do so more slowly in ASD, it should manifest here. The percentage of the residual
variance explained (after accounting for the inter-stimulus interval) by the best-fitting
modulatory effect model for each group is plotted in Figure 5.3B. The color code
corresponds to the peak µ of the model at that time point, evaluated as in Figure 5.2B.
The statistical significance of these measurements is rendered in Figure 5.3C. The
average waveform for each group is plotted with a color scale indicating the peak µ for
each time point. The peak µ at each time point was tested for significance and the entire
plot for each group FDR corrected for time points (308 points at 512 Hz) and drifting
norm models (51 values of µ). Separately an FDR corrected group difference was
calculated for each time point and drifting norm model via bootstrap resampling. Time
points plotted in color represent significant within-group and between-group effects.
These plots demonstrate a circumscribed modulatory effect in the neurotypical group
beginning close to the center of the N170 component (196.8 ms after stimulus onset) and
terminating approximately in the middle of the N250 component (325.8 ms after stimulus
onset). The peak decay rate (µ) of the modulatory effect in the neurotypical group across
this stage of the evoked response ranged from 0.58 to 1, with a median of 0.82.
The modulatory effects in the ASD group manifest differently across the average evoked
response. The peak µ for the ASD group is consistently higher relative to the neurotypical
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group, ranging from 0 to 0.46, with a median of 0.26, reflecting shorter windows of
temporal integration driving the modulatory effects. Further, though the onset of
significant modulation begins at the N170 in the ASD group (198.8 ms after stimulus
onset), the modulatory effects persist longer.
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Figure 5.4: Raw variance data across the time course
(a) The average variance for each group (neurotypical in yellow, ASD in blue) for each
time point of 600 msec epoch. (b) The percentage of the variance in A explained by the
modeling of interstimulus interval for each group. (c) The percentage of the raw variance
explained by the peak temporal history model for each group, across time.
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For completeness, we also present raw variance data (Figure 5.4) including the proportion
of the variance explained across time points by the effects of interstimulus interval
(Figure 5.4B) for each group and the effects of the peak modulatory model (Figure 5.4C).
5.5 Discussion
In this study we investigate the time course of the evoked response to faces in autism
spectrum disorder. We demonstrate that, relative to neurotypical controls, participants
with ASD exhibit modulations of their evoked response based upon more recent stimulus
history - in essence a more moment-to-moment neural calculation of similarity from
sensory evidence to stimulus history. We demonstrate this first within the P200
component of the evoked response to faces, which has been demonstrated to show
stimulus history effects (Kahn et al., 2010). We expand this finding by demonstrating that
not only are modulations in ASD based on more recent stimulus history, but that these
modulatory effects are evident for a longer period of the evoked response to faces. While
we had hypothesized the former would occur in our data, the latter feature was novel. It
seems very possible that a shift in the modulatory window could have cascading effects
on the face processing stream.
While these results are exciting, it is important to recognize several limitations. First, we
use a limited stimulus set to assess effects, so the range of potential modulations is
smaller. The behavior of the drifting norm model for highly dissimilar stimuli is less well
understood (Mattar et al., in preparation). Additionally, our findings are limited to the
realm of faces. To assess whether this is a general mechanism of altered neural processing
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in ASD, we would want to use different stimulus modalities. Lastly, our relatively small
sample size limits our ability to assess individual differences. Future work can optimize
our approach to link it to the ASD phenotype.
Several recent neurocognitive models of ASD correspond well to our findings. The high,
inflexible precision of prediction errors in autism account (HIPPEA, Van de Cruys et al.,
2014) suggests that low-level sensory information, interpreted as prediction errors, is
encoded maladaptively. HIPPEA suggests that in the context of sensory responses
representing deviations from expectation, ASD may be understood as an increase in
precision of these prediction errors that is invariant to context. Though our model of
modulatory effects on neural responses (Mattar et al., in preparation) arose from an
exploration of representational geometry, its conceptual basis can be readily linked to the
theories of predictive encoding. The “drifting norm” here discussed can be interpreted as
a rolling sensory prediction, and modulations relative to the norm (deviations) as
prediction error signals. If interpreted this way, the measurements we demonstrate here
corroborate HIPPEA’s account (Van de Cruys et al., 2014).
Related but distinct to the concept of ASD as a disorder of prediction is the proposal of a
Bayesian basis for ASD (Pellicano & Burr, 2012). In this account, Pellicano & Burr
suggest that to the extent sensory information processing can be modeled as a Bayesian
inference, ASD could be marked by attenuated priors (or “hypopriors”), placing an
overemphasis on incoming sensory information in establishing a percept. Critiques of this
model (Friston et al., 2013; van Boxtel & Lu, 2013; Van de Cruys et al., 2013) pointed to
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the lack of a neural framework to explain the concept of hypopriors. Our findings could
bolster this account; to the extent that the drifting norm represents a form of prior,
calculation of this norm on a more moment-to-moment basis (e.g. with a higher decay
rate, µ) would effectively de-emphasize generalization, and could reduce the usefulness
or even establishment of a prior.
Separate from the concept of predictive coding, it was recently suggested that evoked
responses in ASD are unreliable, exhibiting greater intra-individual variability of
stimulus-evoked responses in fMRI (IIV, Dinstein et al., 2012; Haigh et al., 2014). It is
non-trivial to assess the interactions of our findings with the account of greater intraindividual variability in ASD.
If one were to consider the “drifting norm” as an actual image prior existing in our onedimensional stimulus space, and then to calculate the pixel-wise differences between the
current stimulus and the drifting norm across the time course of the experiment, the
variability of this pixel-wise difference plot over time would increase as a function of
decay rate. Phrased differently, the amplitude of the signal generated by an encoding
system using a given decay rate will increase as a function of decay rate. This observation
reflects the fact that the visual world is prone to high frequency change inessential to an
understanding material reality (we hesitate to call this noise). A neural system with a
lower decay rate (µ) in essence applies a low-pass filter to this signal, dampening the
features of visual change. The difference we observe in ASD, lower decay rates (µ), is a
shift toward less filtering. The open question would seem to be whether greater intra!111

individual variability reflects a reduction in signal-to-noise or a fundamental difference in
the nature of the signal encoded. We would argue in favor of the latter interpretation.
The alternative view flips the relationship between IIV and µ - the argument that IIV is
“upstream” of a larger decay rate for sensory evidence (µ). We think this is less likely for
two reasons. If intra-individual variability is higher, it seems likely that a neural system
would opt to reduce the weighting of current sensory evidence to maintain stability
(lower µ for higher IIV). Also, if intrinsic noise were higher in ASD, why then is higher
IIV predominately observed for stimulus-evoked signals (Dinstein et al., 2012; Haigh et
al., 2014)? Generally, we feel the similarities between the increased IIV account of ASD
& our findings outweigh any disagreements. We would suggest our result offers an
exciting new avenue for exploring the origins of increased IIV in ASD.
In this article we have offered a perspective on the dynamics of visual evoked responses
in ASD. While the modeling framework is relatively new, we feel the findings generally
support a number of existing neurocognitive theories of ASD focused on perception. A
great deal of research will be needed to begin to explain how the measures we assess
emerge from visual networks, and how this emergence varies as a function of
connectivity of the network. A mechanistic neural perspective on ASD will require more
than the narrow window on the brain reported here.
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6 General Discussion
The work presented in this thesis has unified two effects of neural encoding - what we
called neural adaptation and norm-based effects - in terms of one modulatory mechanism
based on stimulus history. The fundamental variable of this model is the decay rate (µ)
which determines how much of recent sensory history is used in establishing a reference
point. The updating of this reference point is done on a rolling basis - as the visual world
is ever changing, so too must the drifting norm update.
Plenty of questions remain about the picture we draw of stimulus history effects on neural
responses. In our experiments, we can’t dissociate between the effects of recent stimulus
history measured in units of time and that measured in stimulus presentations; our
experiments were not designed to separate these two. One could envision an experiment
where stimuli are presented for varying amount of time while also varying in metric
similarity to each other. It also remains to be explored whether there is one or several
references points maintained perceptually. The stimuli we used were all sampled from a
single continuous space. What would happen if there were implicit groupings of stimuli?
It seems likely that several local norms could be established. If so, is there an upper limit
to the number of norms?
Another aspect of our experiments that gets me: how often does one really see a series of
faces presented serially? While this is useful to make detailed measurements, I wonder
how stimulus history effects are instantiated under natural or naturalistic viewing
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conditions? In this work, we begin to understand the neural calculus that is used to filter
incoming visual information. How does this scale to the experience of real environment?
I think this latter question is quite important when discussing the implications of our
work to autism spectrum disorder. In ASD, we observe that the timescale over which the
reference is calculated is shorter, corresponding to a reduction in the smoothing of
sensory input. Ignoring information via smoothing isn’t necessarily a net loss - there is a
forest to see if you gloss over the trees. If we had a better understanding of how sensory
history effects played out in full environments, we might gain an understanding of how
the world “feels” to someone whose visual system smoothes less. A thought experiment I
considered recently: if we could use neural measurements of sensory history effects in
ASD drawn from the experience of a movie (for instance) could we apply a filter to the
movie (exaggerating variation for instance) to impose similar visual cortical modulation
in a neurotypical viewer? This proposal relies on a reverse inference: matching the
cortical modulation doesn’t mean the percept is the same. However, it might be possible
to validate the method by designing stimuli that are salient to a neurotypical individual
when filtered & testing whether the unfiltered stimulus is salient to someone with ASD.
This prospect has potentially fun applications: if we could validate a model of how the
world looks to someone with ASD, would be possible, for instance, to design a classroom
which minimizes overstimulation for students on the spectrum?
If we return to the central question framed by the introduction to this thesis - how the
visual system balances encoding variation and yet generalizes - we’re left with a clear set
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questions: how is this trade-off balancing act evaluated? Phrased differently: what
determines the timescale of smoothing across variation? Why is this calculation different
in autism? I will speculate around a few avenues to walk in search of answers, and then
walk down one a much further than I think any current research justifies.
The first avenue toward a possible answer focuses on unit characteristics. That is, on the
properties and activity of neurons or perhaps cortical columns - the building blocks of the
systems and streams discussed here. This avenue holds a lot of promise, as it will be most
easily integrated with understanding from other fields such as genetics and animal
models. The second focuses on network qualities of sensory systems - how does the
distributed system appear to behave.
This second avenue has been of particular interest to me through the development of this
work. One way to conceptualize visual representation is a distributed mapping of a
perceptual space onto a neural network. The modulatory activity related to sensory
history we discuss here could represent topological alterations to this representational
surface. The gradient of modulatory activity we observe across the cortex could be
understood as different dynamics of this topology - short windows of temporal
integration could be like a drum which bounces back immediately after deformation,
whereas longer windows are like memory foam that takes longer to reshape.
It should be noted that this finding of different temporal characteristics across the cortex
has been echoed in other work using different methods. Uri Hasson used the term
“temporal receptive windows” to describe the amount of time different patches of visual
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cortex seems to care about (Hasson et al. 2008). Recent work in monkeys suggested
intrinsic timescales existed in hierarchies across cortex (Murray et al. 2014). The
interaction of sensory information and time seems like it could be a fundamental
organizing principle of cortical activity. If we were to extend the gradient we observed in
Chapter 3, we might glimpse the possibility (as in Murray et al. 2014) of a brain-wide
map of timescales. Of course, we also observe that this gradient seems to shift a bit based
on stimulus properties - perhaps our map could bring in the different possible temporalintegration states of each patch of cortex into a chart across stimulus conditions. What
else might cause it to vary? Let’s add more maps.
What we quickly realize in this search for maps is that the measures needn’t be limited to
the modulatory timescales we’ve spent this whole thesis exploring. Countless other
neural calculations unfold across cortex. Receptive fields vary in size & location. Sensory
modalities as well. The early findings of fMRI demonstrated functional areas such as the
fusiform face area (FFA), a patch of cortex which prefers faces to other classes of visual
objects dot the cortex as well.
By analogy these are state-by-state maps in geography; perhaps our timescale gradient is
something akin to mean temperature or population density. Still other maps exist. A huge
wing of computational neuroscience has focused on connectivity analyses - using
different imaging modalities to evaluate the strength of connections between two regions
of the brain. The layering of such maps under different conditions has also been
approached - Danielle Bassett and Marcelo Mattar (a collaborator of mine on the
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temporal integration work) at Penn have been observing differences in functional
connectivity across brain areas under different task conditions.
Let’s speculate what it would be like to have even more measures than receptive fields
and temporal windows and connectivity profiles. What other maps might we draw? By
analogy, the humanities are way ahead of us. A friend of mine during my years at Penn,
Andy Fenelon, did his graduate work in demography - a field which excels at mapping.
One could understand much about the United States by layering maps of population
density and median income and mean social network size, for instance. Could we start to
ask new questions with enough information?
A fun question I’ve been pondering is “why is the fusiform face area where it is?” - if we
had enough maps would it be the obvious place for it to fall? (By analogy to geography, a
related question is “why is the film industry in Hollywood?” - a little knowledge of
climate and film history answers this).
Eventually these sort of questions and the collection of maps would demand a level of
rigor. What I think we might need are new terms to describe the approach to information
processing at the population level - not necessarily systems neuroscience - but truly a
crowd or mob understanding within and across systems. I would suggest something like
neurodemography or socioneurology. Sociology being the study of information transfer
across a population, and demography the mapping of distributions of traits across a
population based on factors such as geography.
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In many ways, this is what the field of neuroscience is doing already - careful
characterization of the brain at many levels. However, it seems to me that the useful thing
(soon) would be to bring together this information in whatever and every way possible.
What would follow would be the brain equivalent of what companies like Facebook or
Amazon are doing currently with their users - developing cohesive, exhaustive profiles of
what each user (patch of cortex) is doing across a variety of measures. This deep profiling
is the raw material that might allow for mechanistic understandings to coalesce. And just
as Amazon uses algorithms to target consumers, so too might deep learning algorithms
mine neurodemographic profiles to, for instance, diagnose psychiatric disorders in a
distributed way via deep learning algorithms. I think this is where the network road leads
- deep profiling followed by deep learning to abstract a model of the brain’s processing
space.
As out there as I feel like we’ve reached in this discussion, I’m convinced there’s much
further to go. I think simply of how much I’ve grown over the course of my graduate
school career & I’m reminded that the brain is not a static processor - the maps I could
have collected (were I able) of my own brain at the outset of graduate school might not
even tell me much about it today. Though I do really aspire to make sense of all this, I
find that fact oddly comforting.
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